

Allied Force Headquarters during the North African Campaign: A study of Allied integrated
multi-national command organization from August 1942 – May 1943

Research Thesis

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by

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Glossary

AFHQ – Allied Force Headquarters

ACoS – Assistant Chief of Staff

CAO – Chief Administrative Officer

CCS – Combined Chiefs of Staff

C-in-C – Commander in Chief

COHQ – British Combined Operations Headquarters

CP – Command Post

CSC – British Chiefs of Staff Committee

DACoS – Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff

DC-in-C – Deputy Commander in Chief

DQMG – Deputy Quartermaster General

GHQ MEF – General Headquarters Middle East Forces (British)

JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff

JPS – Joint Planning Staff

NATOUA – North African Theater of Operations, United States Army

SHAEF – Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

SOE – Special Operations Executive

SOS – Service of Supply

ETOUSA – European Theater of Operations, United States Army

Introduction

With the ever-growing trove of literature on World War II it would seem that there are few areas left to explore. Indeed, in the military history section of any given book store in the United States, World War II will most likely stand out in sheer quantity of books being offered for sale. This is no doubt because in the United States, the Second World War still looms large in the national memory as a beacon of pride, and in the post-war world the United States was catapulted firmly into the highest strata of world powers. The United States' rise to preeminence has resulted in a major focus within military history on the relationships between the Allied nations, predominately that of the United States and Great Britain. The depth of research that has been dedicated to this topic is truly extensive with numerous volumes dedicated to analyzing the relationship of Roosevelt and Churchill, and between various generals of both nations. It would appear to be a topic that simply cannot be discussed any further. But this is not the case.

When surveying this topic, one quickly realizes that the analysis of individuals has revolved predominately around the highest strata of military and government officials. In fact, a significant amount of effort has been spent on the same individuals at either the very top of the command hierarchy, like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, or George C. Marshall; or they focus on senior commanders of the combat arms such as George S. Patton Jr., Omar Bradley, Bernard Montgomery, or Harold Alexander. Naturally, the focus on those individuals directly involved in shaping strategy or those leading large organizations in combat is most attractive given the available subject material and the public interest in such figures. Indeed, the strategic debates at the top and the feuds among commanders are rife with heated arguments, controversy, and intrigue amid monumental struggles. This approach has,

more or less, dominated the discussion and it continues to be one of keen interest to historians.¹ Despite this heavy focus on the “higher-ups” of World War II, other more recent works have taken on the more difficult task of giving a voice to those in the lower rungs of leadership and staff work.² Accompanying this vast array of literature on the Anglo-American relationship is also an equally, if not larger, quantity of traditional military history with a heavy focus on campaigns, operations, battles, or the units that took part in them.³ Yet, among these seemingly endless quantities of analyses and re-evaluations of World War II and its most prominent figures, it seems that very few historians have attempted to grapple with the command and staff organizations that made the Allied enterprise function—especially during the nascent stages of the Anglo-American alliance in North Africa.

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) was the first attempt in history at fully integrating a command organization between two separate nations with two separate command structures. AFHQ was created to oversee Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North

¹ This approach to analyzing the Anglo-American relationship is embodied in books such as David Irving’s *The War Between the Generals* (New York: Congdon & Lattès, 1981), volumes of biographies such as *Churchill’s Generals* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) edited by John Keegan, Andrew Roberts’ *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West* (New York: Harper, 2009), and *Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) by Paul Dukes. One also need not look very hard for numerous volumes focused on one individual, like Carlo D’Este’s *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002) or the four-volume series *George C. Marshall* (New York: Viking Press, 1963-1989) by Forrest C. Pogue. Others, like *War by Land, Sea, Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command* (2010) by David Jablonsky, examine both the individual and principles or concepts that they sought to pioneer during the war.

² *Battalion Commanders at War: U.S. Tactical Leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942-1943* (Lawrence, K.S.: University Press of Kansas, 2013), by Steven Thomas Barry takes this approach in a re-evaluation of the U.S. officer corps during the first years of America’s involvement in the war against Germany and Italy. James Holland, in *Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa 1942-1943* (New York: Hyperion, 2005), merges the accounts of both the more widely known generals and lesser known soldiers at the very bottom into the general narrative of Anglo-American relations. This method of meshing analyses of top and bottom also appears in *Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2015) by Niall Barr, although it is not the main focus and the book stretches the length of the entire war.

³ It appears that this approach is taking a slightly new direction as can be seen in Vincent O’Hara’s *TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory* (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2015). O’Hara has picked up an operation in a theater of World War II that seems to be viewed as a backwater, surrounding a core focus on shipping and the development of amphibious warfare with aspects of traditional military history.

Africa and it provided the arena for General Dwight Eisenhower's first taste of the complexities of command during a time of war. It also eventually oversaw the entire North African Campaign and the invasions of Sicily and Italy, forming an organizational foundation for the headquarters—the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)—that oversaw the invasion of France and the advance through the Low Countries and into Nazi Germany. The U.S. Army official history of SHAEF, *The Supreme Command*, states that AFHQ “provided a laboratory for testing principles and procedures of the command and training of U.S. and British staffs in combined operations.”⁴ Despite its importance, very little has been written specifically addressing the command organization and its role in the war. Indeed, some accounts of the North African campaign, or the Mediterranean Theater of Operations more generally do not even mention it. Others mention AFHQ only briefly or it only appears with a purpose of supporting the main narrative with little discussion of the headquarters itself. As a result, most of the senior officers who worked directly under Eisenhower in this command organization have hardly been recognized in any meaningful capacity.⁵ Indeed, only one historian has placed AFHQ at the

⁴ Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), 56. The other headquarters that contributed largely to SHAEF's creation was Headquarters, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (COSSAC), which was created during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 to plan the cross-channel invasion of France; *ibid.*, 56-58. For AFHQ's role and evolution from 1942-1944 see the official history of AFHQ parts I, II, and III. PDF files can be downloaded from the Defense Technical Information Center at https://publicaccess.dtic.mil/psm/api/service/search/search?q=&num=10&site=default_collection&as_epq=History+of+Allied+Force+Headquarters&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_occt=any&btnG=Search. For hard copies in the U.S. see: History of Allied Force Headquarters, 1942-1945; Records of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (World War II), 1942-1947, Record Group (RG) 498, Box 4071; NARA 2, College Park, MD. For hard copies in the U.K. see: Records of the Cabinet Office (CAB); War Cabinet Office: Historical Section: Archivist and Librarian Files: (AL Series) (CAB 106); Subseries: War of 1939-1945; CAB 106/515-523, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, U.K. Parts IV and V are not published but can be found in AFHQ Microfilm; Reel Section: Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat, Historical Section; Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, RG 331; NARA 2.

⁵ For example, William Breuer's *Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) does not mention AFHQ at all nor any of the officers; neither does Orr Kelly in his book *Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa: From Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia* (New York: J. Wiley, 2002). Carlo D'Este mentions AFHQ only briefly in a few pages of his book *World War II in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990) with no mention of any of the officers. The same could be said of Niall Barr's *Eisenhower's Armies*. Concerning the officers some are indeed discussed but hardly in the context of the inner workings of AFHQ. For example, Lieutenant General Sir

center of his evaluation of the Anglo-American alliance in the Mediterranean. Matthew Jones' *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44* (1990) attempts to place AFHQ within a larger narrative discussing both the military and political situation that unfolded in North Africa. On the surface it would appear that a book that places AFHQ at its core would provide a more nuanced analysis of the command structure; however, it does anything but this. In fact, Jones's only attempt to provide any form of a layout of the command structure is buried in the endnotes.⁶ Thus, it is with this understanding that I have attempted to examine AFHQ as a command organization more closely, as well as a select group of lesser known senior officers, and intertwine these details within the larger context of the war.

This approach has produced a considerable challenge as AFHQ quickly ballooned into a monolithic command structure, numbering just over 4,000 personnel by the end of 1943, excluding those in the combat arms.⁷ As a result, I have decided to narrow my analysis to the senior officers who presided over the General Staff Sections. Additionally, the principles of "unity of command and effort" and "balanced personnel," which Eisenhower sought to champion in AFHQ, are best demonstrated at this level. Through this the integrated nature of AFHQ that forced British and American personnel to work together can be more closely examined. Another factor that was necessary to take into consideration was the likelihood of finding information on the personnel who are the focus of this study. Even limiting my examination of Anglo-American

Humfrey Gale, the British officer who presided over all the administrative functions of AFHQ is mentioned frequently, but like AFHQ only as supporting information. The most famous officer from AFHQ, besides Eisenhower, is probably General Walter Bedell Smith who, like Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall, has received much attention by historians.

⁶ See Endnote 7 of Chapter 2 of Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 246.

⁷ History of Allied Force Headquarters; Part II: December 1942 - December 1943, pg. 246; History of Allied Force Headquarters, 1942-1945; RG 498, Box 4071; NARA 2, College Park, MD. From here on cited as "History of AFHQ, Pt. #, pg. #, RG 498, NARA 2." Parts II and III of the official history are subdivided into sections with each section being its own book. Citations for parts II and III will thus have the addition of the section after the part number. For example: "Pt. II, Sec. 2."

relations to the heads of the General Staff Sections has proved quite difficult as the information available was variable at best. For example, it took researching the primary material created by AFHQ in both the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, and the British National Archives in Kew before I was even able to determine the exact names of certain British and American officers. This created another issue of a balanced narrative when discussing the relationships of the British and American General Staff officers. As a result, I have attempted to discuss their interactions in a manner that brings life to AFHQ, juxtaposing them to the extensively covered Anglo-American relations more generally.

Although the main focus of my work is a deep dive into the structural set-up of AFHQ and the relationships of the General Staff officers, it is also necessary to place these issues in the broader context of the war. This led to restricting my analysis to the period of AFHQ's birth in August of 1942 to the end of the North African campaign in May of 1943. This has allowed me to focus on the period in which AFHQ was established, its organization first tested during the invasion of North Africa in November of 1942; and through the subsequent push to Tunisia; while including the changes that occurred as a result of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 and the jarring defeat of U.S. forces at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. A further analysis of AFHQ in the latter half of 1943 would require a longer and more extensive analysis as it was during this time that the British headquarters in charge of the Middle East was merged with AFHQ.⁸ Additionally, the official history of AFHQ notes that the operations of 1944 and 1945 "were designed and directed by the Headquarters organization little changed from what it had become in 1943."⁹

⁸ See History of AFHQ, Pt. III, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁹ Ibid., Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. iv.

The first section of this paper deals with Anglo-American relations more broadly in the interwar period leading into the Arcadia Conference in December 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. From there the discussion transitions to a focus on the debates concerning Allied strategy that ensued in the subsequent months. The section ends with the decision to invade North Africa in July 1942, entitled Operation Torch. The second section shifts focus to AFHQ more specifically, discussing both the principles on which the command was founded and also the general layout of the headquarters, dealing primarily with General Staff Sections. The section opens up with a discussion of the attempt by Marshall to create a unified command in Southeast Asia in early 1942, and Eisenhower's role in drafting its directives. As will be seen, this event was a critical development for both Eisenhower and the creation of AFHQ, which is subsequently examined. Indeed, the principles of "unity of command and effort" and "balanced personnel" can be seen as "lessons-learned" from the experiences in Southeast Asia. Their importance cannot be understated and as such they are examined first explicitly in their meaning, and then demonstrated in the rest of the section with the breakdown of the General Staff Sections.

The third section brings AFHQ out of its development phase and into the execution of Operation Torch and the subsequent push into Tunisia. Emphasis here is less on the movements of personnel, combat units, etc., and more so in discussing key events that exacerbated tensions within the Anglo-American alliance both in a broader context and within AFHQ. After the invasion the dealings with the French proved to be a considerable source of tension within the alliance more generally but also in North Africa. The peace deal brokered with Vichy Admiral Francois Darlan caused a political backlash domestically that simply cannot be ignored in the context of AFHQ and the entire operation. Additionally, the inclusion of French forces at the

Tunisian front was a shaping factor in how AFHQ operated and also where the French stood as an Allied power within the context of the headquarters. Among these issues, internal disputes between British and American officers began to resurge as the reality of events on the ground began to strain what had been a relatively amicable and hopeful relationship. I examined these more closely by utilizing the limited information available in order to create a set of “case studies” that explore how the officers of the General Staff responded to these pressures.

Finally, in the last section I examine the changes in AFHQ that occurred as a result of the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s offensive that led to the humiliating defeat of U.S. forces Kasserine Pass in February. It begins with a brief discussion of the changes made in the combat commands, especially the incorporation of the British Eighth Army and the creation of the 18th Army Group. The main focus, however, returns to the General Staff sections and the creation of the North African Theater of Operations, which constituted a profound shift in the administrative functioning of AFHQ. While military historians have extensively analyzed the series of defeats in the month of February and their effects on the U.S. military, the effects on the General Staff of AFHQ have not. This is not to say that the dismissal of the chief of the intelligence section of AFHQ and the U.S. commander of II Corps have not been covered by historians.¹⁰ Rather, historians have assumed that after these sackings the issue

¹⁰ In fact, there is a common narrative that has persisted with only one challenge to it occurring in the early 1980’s by historian Stephen E. Ambrose and rejected by Ralph Bennett. In the sixth appendix of his book, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945*, Bennett chastises the attempts of Ambrose to exonerate AFHQ’s chief of G-2, Mockler-Ferryman, in an article published in the *Journal of Contemporary History*. Relying on evidence given to him based off of what the official British intelligence history was going to say, Ambrose claims that Mockler-Ferryman was relieved of command to even out (on the basis of nationality) the sacking of Fredendall. Bennett refutes this asserting that the official history, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, fails to exonerate Mockler-Ferryman in any substantial way. Returning to Ambrose, he points to the fact that in his book *Eisenhower*, published three years after the article, Ambrose makes no mention of the information given to him on Mockler-Ferryman. For Bennett’s argument see: Ralph Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 376. For Ambrose’s article see: Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1981): 165. For what the British official history does, and does not, say see: F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, *British*

was resolved. My research has led me to challenge the assumptions made in this common narrative that continues to hold the chief of AFHQ's intelligence was sacked because of incompetence. Admittedly, this challenge has absorbed a considerable amount of the final section, however, the implications could potentially be considerable in how the Anglo-American relationship should be viewed in the aftermath of the Kasserine Pass. The closing discussion wraps up the section with a brief description of the final months of the North African Campaign and the continued expansion of AFHQ throughout 1943.

The lack of combat narrative and battle statistics has been a deliberate undertaking throughout this study. However, it includes enough information to keep the core discussion within the larger context of the phenomenon in which AFHQ was created and functioned. Indeed, one cannot ignore the physical conflicts when studying a military command structure in a time of war by placing the subject material in a vacuum for the sake of ease and brevity. Ideally, such a history would weave a complex narrative capturing every aspect from multiple perspectives. Unfortunately, this is simply impossible and so those who seek to write a history of their own must strike a balance between what is necessary and what can be sacrificed for the greater narrative. This has been one of the greatest, and most frustrating, challenges in conducting this study. However, such a study into the command and control bodies during a time of war is critical to expanding our understanding of not just how the war was fought, and won, but also the vast and complex array of individual reactions and relationships in an environment of considerable stress. Finally, and more specifically, my study has attempted to pay more than

Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Operations and Strategy, Vol. IV (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 577-592, 739-746.

lip-service to the colossal undertaking that allows combat units to reach the front lines, and that sustains them once there so that they can properly perform the task at hand.

Part 1 – Anglo-American Relations and Strategic Debates Prior to Operation Torch

Anglo-American relations were less than cordial prior to World War II and in fact, American views on Europe as a whole were unfavorable. Tracing American disdain for European affairs back to the Revolutionary War, historian Mark Stoler states that “[i]f Americans disliked and shunned European politics and nations...they had a history of disliking Great Britain more than the others.”¹¹ Naturally this attitude stemmed from the fact that the United States had once been colonial holdings of Great Britain, but the animosity between the two nations continued, culminating in the War of 1812 and even spilling into the American Civil War. In the subsequent decades these tensions began to abate as mutual understanding of power relations developed; however, they were far from being eradicated. New seeds of distrust were sown between the United States and Britain with the outbreak of World War I. Despite American entrance into the war on the side of the Entente, the United States chose to fight as an “associated power.” The most notable conflicts arose with the deployment of American forces in Europe and the outcome of the post-war peace process. When U.S. troops arrived in France, the British and French sought to amalgamate them into existing units along the Western Front. This proposal met a stiff refusal by American commander General John J. Pershing, who demanded a separate theater of operations drawn on national lines in order to keep American forces intact. After the war, the U.S. Senate stirred an already simmering pot of disdain by refusing to ratify the

¹¹Mark A. Stoler, *Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 2.

Versailles Treaty, which meant that the U.S. did not join the League of Nations. As a result, the British deemed the U.S. as “an untrustworthy and fickle ally.”¹²

The inter-war period saw little change in the mutual perceptions between the British and Americans. If anything, the disputes from World War I and the fallout of the Versailles Treaty increased tensions between the two countries, with U.S. military planners even categorizing Great Britain as a potential threat.¹³ They viewed the wartime coalition as nothing more than a temporary relationship and during the 1920s even drew up war plans for a potential conflict with the British over commercial disputes in the Atlantic. Similarly, the British viewed Anglo-American trade disputes, as well as the size of the American navy, as potential grounds for war.¹⁴ However, this outlook was not firmly held by either the U.S. Army or the U.S. Navy, with the latter no longer seeing Great Britain as a threat by the early 1930s. The navy switched to a Pacific-oriented policy, code-named War Plan Orange, and instead increased cooperation with the British.¹⁵

In fact, this shift in the navy’s strategic thinking is only a small glimpse into the larger strategic debate that raged within the American military throughout the inter-war period. Initially, the army opposed the navy’s switch in stance and contended that an alliance with Great Britain would result in misuse of American forces. Army leaders believed the British were manipulative and would seek only to exploit the U.S. military to bolster their empire. These sentiments were indicative of the still lingering distrust of the British and would continue to

¹² Ibid., 2-3.

¹³ U.S. planners designated British forces as red in inter-war color plans.

¹⁴ Stoler, *Allies in War*, 3.

¹⁵ See Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

resurface in the coming years.¹⁶ The British view of the United States was no better. As historian Matthew Jones describes it, “The British were prone to resentment at the overall American approach to international problems in the inter-war years, where a moralizing tone was seen to accompany a reluctance to undertake firm commitments.”¹⁷ This was compounded by Roosevelt’s shifting position on international affairs, which incidentally was an approach to politics in general that considerably strained his relations with his own military leaders as well.¹⁸

The year 1938 prompted a shift in U.S. military strategy as tensions began to mount in Europe. Until then U.S. military planners had only considered a war with one hostile country at a time, focusing almost exclusively on Japan after (most) army planners abandoned their plans for a war with Great Britain in 1936. With the looming prospect of hostilities erupting in Europe, American planners were forced to consider a multi-theater war against multiple belligerents. This prompted the creation of the Rainbow strategic contingency plans. However, this realization did not immediately translate into unfettered support for the British by the U.S. military. Although planners had acknowledged the possibility of a Franco-Anglo-American alliance, this possibility was considered in only two of the five plans that constituted the Rainbow series and neither was seriously considered in 1939 or 1940. In fact, the most prominent plan was one that assumed the United States would fight alone against the Axis powers.¹⁹

In the wake of German victories over Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France, Roosevelt had authorized a number of initiatives by the end of 1940 to give Great Britain some degree of support. These included limited sales of military equipment and the trade of fifty

¹⁶ Mark A Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of Chapel Hill Press, 2000), 8-9.

¹⁷ Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 3-4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-5. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 16.

¹⁹ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 9, 18-21.

antiquated destroyers for a near-century-long lease on British military bases in the Caribbean, Bermuda, and Canada. Roosevelt had also authorized the deployment to England of military observers tasked with gauging British longevity in the war.²⁰ The president's decision to aid Great Britain drew sharp, if silent criticism from the U.S. military leadership. They viewed the move as frittering away valuable war material that they desperately needed for their own ill-equipped forces on a nation they viewed as all but lost. However, given Roosevelt's insistence to aid the British and the latter's survival after the Battle of Britain, U.S. military planners were again forced to re-evaluate their strategic options.²¹

Having won re-election in November 1940, Roosevelt was no longer shackled by domestic constraints and sought to expand aid to the British, which British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been calling for since becoming prime minister in May 1940. This aid materialized in the Lend-Lease Act passed in March 1941, which effectively made the United States a de facto ally of Great Britain.²² In the same month that Roosevelt was re-elected, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark undertook a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. military strategy. He developed four options, as opposed to the five in the Rainbow Plans, labeled plans A-D. His preferred plan, or "Plan Dog" in military parlance, was the strategic positioning that Stark advocated in his memorandum to the president.²³ In Plan Dog Stark had, for the first time, definitively laid out the connection of British survival and American security while simultaneously avoiding the feared pitfall of American troops being utilized for British imperial purposes. Stark pressed for an Atlantic-focused strategy that advocated offensive

²⁰ Stoler, *Allies in War*, 14-16, 18-20.

²¹ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 28-29.

²² Stoler, *Allies in War*, 18-20.

²³ Admiral Harold R. Stark, "Memorandum for the Secretary," November 12, 1940, <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a48b01.html>.

operations in Europe, a defensive stance in the Pacific, and the initiation of strategic talks between American, British, Canadian and Dutch staffs. Although the plan that Stark and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall presented to Roosevelt in January of 1941 was labeled Plan Dog, the plan itself had undergone a revision that included army critiques of Stark's initial proposals. However, the army planners saw Stark's plan as too provocative in the Pacific; having not forgotten their experiences in World War I they also attacked his proposal of using British bases to launch attacks into Europe and bluntly stated that Anglo-American strategic talks would only happen if U.S. forces remained under American authority.²⁴

The apprehensions and animosities that had existed prior to the war continued throughout 1941 as intense debates swirled around the Lend-Lease Act and strategy. In regard to trade the British balked at U.S. demands that they saw as damaging and hypocritical, in the sense that they viewed American outlooks on the matter as a form of economic imperialism.²⁵ Among the British there was also a sense of superiority and maturity in world affairs; many Britons viewed the Americans as infantile militarily and politically, yet necessary for the successful prosecution of the war effort. The Americans on the other hand still viewed the British with much cynicism believing, in earnest, that they were not to be trusted. Similarly, American disdain for British imperialism continued. Concerning strategic co-operation, Roosevelt never explicitly approved Plan Dog; however, he did not reject it either, and Marshall and Stark secured his approval to begin staff talks with the British. Thus, Anglo-American joint-strategic planning commenced with the U.S. military presenting a plan that roughly correlated to British strategic interests, and the planners declared Germany as the top priority for future operations.

²⁴ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 28-33.

²⁵ Stoler *Allies in War*, 54-56.

Yet despite this agreement, tensions quickly arose between the two staffs. For the American staff, the best course of action was an immediate buildup of forces in England to support a large-scale operation into Europe. The British, on the other hand, argued that such an operation should be taken only after other Allied operations had brought Germany to the brink of collapse. This, they claimed, could be accomplished through strategic bombing, blockades, small scale operations coupled with the cultivation of homegrown resistance, acquisition of strategic locations, and the defeat of Italy—the latter necessitating operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa. The resulting report, labeled “ABC-1,” in the end amounted to little more than a list of differing opinions.²⁶ Additionally, the fact that the Mediterranean was vital for the maintenance of the British Empire was not lost on U.S. military planners. This notion underpinned their assumptions of British strategy and received fresh fuel in May, after Churchill openly called for the United States to formally enter the war and again advocated the British peripheral approach.²⁷

Aside from the strategic dispute with the United States, 1941 proved militarily disastrous for the British. Their piecemeal victories in late-1940 and early-1941 in Libya and Greece were voided by Axis counter offensives. The advances made by the British Middle East forces were checked by the deployment in February 1941 of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and two understrength divisions of the Afrika Corps. In April, combined Axis operations in the Balkans quickly overwhelmed Allied forces in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete. All the while, British shipping was still being ravaged by German U-Boats in the Atlantic. The German onslaught culminated in the invasion not of Britain, but of Russia, code-named Operation Barbarossa, in

²⁶ Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 6-7, 10-14.

²⁷ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 45-47.

late June. For the Allies this brought a highly mistrusted partner into the mix, with both the British and Americans agreeing to back the “lesser of two evils.” As a result, Roosevelt authorized the extension of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union in November, with the hope of keeping the Red Army in the fight and, supposedly, U.S. forces out of it.²⁸ Unlike Roosevelt, the U.S. military was not as quick to change its opinions, initially believing that the Russians would fall before the year’s end, only to later extend that date into 1942. However, the army eventually saw the entanglement of the Wehrmacht in the East as an opportunity to enact their “spring-board” offensive into Europe, despite the fact the United States was not formally at war with Germany. This proposal did not sit well with Roosevelt, who denied the army’s request to focus military production on the expansion and re-fit of its own forces, choosing instead to increase the material aid to Britain and Russia.²⁹

This all changed with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The attack officially brought the United States into the war and prompted an immediate strategic meeting with the British. The resulting Arcadia Conference lasted two weeks—from December 22, 1941, to January 14, 1942—and set the precedent, for better or worse, for Allied operations for the remainder of the year. Understanding the impact of the Japanese attack, Churchill and his advisors set out to keep American crosshairs on Europe and away from a full dedication to the war in the Pacific.³⁰ The talks resulted in the re-affirmation of the “Germany First” strategy, although as historian Mark Stoler remarks, “These plans virtually ignored the changed circumstances of early 1942.”³¹ Upon Churchill’s arrival in Washington, he immediately laid out

²⁸ Stoler, *Allies in War*, 22-24, 26.

²⁹ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 53-57.

³⁰ Vincent O’Hara, *TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 33.

³¹ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 67.

a concept of an invasion of North Africa (Gymnast) to Roosevelt, and then formally espoused it in a meeting with their chiefs of staff the following day. An interested Roosevelt ordered a study into the proposed operation. The committee's reply on December 26 threw cold water on the it, citing only one viable landing point in Morocco and the roughly 1,400 miles to Tunisia that would prove difficult to cover if the French resisted. The resulting document, drafted by the newly formed Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the bilateral body that would oversee and direct the prosecution of the entire Allied effort during the war, did however make a vague reference to gaining possession of the North African littoral. On the last day of the conference Roosevelt and Churchill made the decision that if the political situation remained stable and shipping was available, Gymnast would proceed in May.³² However, in March the CCS dropped Gymnast as a viable operation, citing the worsening situation of the British Eighth Army in Libya, continued shipping losses, and a hostile Vichy France.³³

Concrete plans to engage U.S. forces against the Germans had also failed to materialize at the conference. Believing that Europe was the primary theater and that it was imperative to keep the Russians in the war, the chief of the U.S. Army's Operations Division, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his staff drafted a comprehensive war plan and submitted it to Marshal on April 1.³⁴ The plan consisted of three major operations: "Bolero," a build-up of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom for a cross-channel invasion of mainland Europe; "Roundup," the cross-channel invasion with a Spring 1943 target date; and "Sledgehammer," an immediate landing in Northern

³² O'Hara, *TORCH*, 34-5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff was the merger of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the newly formed U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, itself created to mirror the British system. Its purpose was to "direct their combined forces and plan global strategy;" see Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 64.

³³ Niall Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies: The American - British Alliance During World War II* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2015), 168; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 67; idem, *Allies in War*, 42-43.

³⁴ David Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 55. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 72-75.

France using mostly British forces in the event that the Russians were on the brink of collapse before Bolero was complete. With Roosevelt's approval Marshall presented the plan to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) on April 9. A few days later on April 14, Marshall presented it again to the British War Cabinet's Defense Committee where, after expressing reservations, Churchill agreed to the U.S. plan.³⁵

Yet, neither the CCS's removal of Gymnast in March nor Churchill's grudging agreement to Marshall's plan were to last for very long. In the subsequent months a series of debates over strategy raged between the U.S. and British military leadership, Churchill, and Roosevelt. Within the U.S. military divides continued to grow and shift as to which theater to concentrate on; coupled with a heightened suspicion of British "scheming" in their insistence on operations in the Mediterranean. The British military, on the other hand, were at odds with Marshall's proposed plan. Although not rejecting the general premise of Bolero and Roundup, Sledgehammer was a major point of contention as the bulk of forces involved would be British; their overall opinion being that the American plan "showed no appreciation of...consequences."³⁶ The official British stance, with Churchill being the largest proponent, emphasized Gymnast instead. Additionally, Roosevelt wanted U.S. forces engaged against Germany by the end of 1942 (preferably before the mid-term elections in November). In fact, he had considered the possibility of an invasion of North Africa since mid-1941, a stance Churchill no doubt exploited in the succeeding months.

By mid-July 1942 strategic talks had essentially ground to a halt. On July 16th Roosevelt instructed Marshall that if the British would not accept Sledgehammer then the only option was

³⁵ O'Hara, *TORCH*, 36-37.

³⁶ Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 169-176, quote from 173.

to pursue an operation in either North Africa or the Middle East.³⁷ Despite this instruction, Marshall continued to press for acceptance of the U.S. plan with a revised Sledgehammer, to no avail. The July 24 agreement reached by the CCS, labeled CCS 94, while not a complete U.S. military approval of Gymnast (renamed Operation Torch), set in motion events that would lead to the Allied invasion of North Africa. The following day Roosevelt cabled Marshall to congratulate him on the outcome of CCS 94 and set an operational date for Torch for October 30, just a few days before the mid-term elections in the United States. Yet, on July 30 the CCS met to discuss Roosevelt's seemingly ambiguous message, not knowing that the decision on operations had already been made. That night Roosevelt, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, announced that Torch was to proceed, to be planned for the earliest date possible, and that it had operational precedence.³⁸

Part 2 – The Principles and Establishment of AFHQ

The main principle that Eisenhower set forth to champion with AFHQ—unity of command—originated at the Arcadia Conference. Although the “Germany First” directive was re-established at the conference, it had become clear that the Allied strategic disposition in Southeast Asia and the Pacific needed to be re-evaluated. Interestingly, Marshall and Eisenhower, the latter attending the conference as the newly appointed deputy chief for the Pacific and the Far East in the War Plans Division, both believed in the concept of unity of command, even though their views on the matter may have differed. Thus, when Eisenhower wrote a memorandum on implementing such a concept in Southeast Asia on December 24 his

³⁷ Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 84-85.

³⁸ O'Hara. *TORCH*, 43-45.

recommendation did not fall on deaf ears. Although he believed in unity of command, in his memorandum Eisenhower limited the scope of its implementation to local areas only, not the entire theater. It was not what Marshall had envisioned. The next day the chief of staff presented his concept for a unified command in Southeast Asia, advocating for a single commander who received orders directly from the CCS (an unprecedented unification of national commands in itself).³⁹ Marshall's insistence on a unified command structure existing in every theater, taking orders only from Washington, was born from his experiences in World War I, during which it was not until 1918 that the Entente powers created a form of unified command.⁴⁰ Another concern was that the British command culture directed theaters of operations via committee, in which the senior commanders of each service within the theater operated through mutual coordination and under supervision of the CSC and the prime minister. No single commander possessed sole authority within any given theater. While this "command by committee" usually solved inter-service issues, as historian Davis Jablonsky points out, these benefits were "more than offset by the inherent problems that beset committees attempting to operate in crisis situations."⁴¹ It was a worrisome aspect of British command culture for Eisenhower and Marshall that would resurface again in 1943.

Marshall's proposal was born out of the acknowledgement, by both the British and the Americans, that a defensive line consisting of Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sunda Islands was necessary in order to prevent the loss of vital resources in the region and a long

³⁹ Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 36, 39; Stoler, *Allies at War*, 42-43. For a description of how Eisenhower became acquainted with the concept of unity of command, and also a brief description of Marshall's views, see chapters one and two of Jablonsky. Additionally, it is interesting to note that Eisenhower had just been assigned his position in the War Plans Division only ten days before writing the memorandum, on December 14.

⁴⁰ Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, Vol. II, *Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 276.

⁴¹ Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 40, quote from same.

campaign of reconquest. The British were initially reluctant to consolidate such a large area citing concerns of effective command and control. However, Marshall had made a crucial point that a change in the command structure was needed in order to best husband the sparse resources in the area and attempt to prevent further Japanese expansion. This was coupled with a British desire for a unity of purpose in the Anglo-American war effort (seeing the suggestion as a way to keep the United States from acting unilaterally in Southeast Asia) and Marshall's suggestion to give the command to Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell, who at the time was C-in-C of British forces in India. The British eventually acquiesced, and on December 30 Churchill cabled Wavell informing him of his new command, designated the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA). The name derived from the fact that the Allied force composition was built from these four nations, as well as New Zealand. However, the experiment in unified multi-national command was short-lived. Rushed implementation, a convoluted command structure, and lack of material and manpower coupled with divided national priorities in the face of continued Japanese advances doomed the command. Lasting a mere forty-one days, the command was dissolved on February 25 following the fall of Singapore and just prior to the allied defeat at the Battle of the Java Sea.⁴²

Despite the ultimate failure of ABDA command, Eisenhower continued to work with the concept through the subsequent months. In early March he prepared a study for Marshall at the request of Roosevelt that would effectively, if not officially, divide the world into three major theaters split between the British and the Americans—the United States would take responsibility for the Pacific, the British would control the Middle and Far East, and the Atlantic

⁴² H. P. Willmot, *Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 259-261, 336-339. An interesting point to note is that the Dutch, New Zealanders, and Australians were not included in the decisions made at the Arcadia Conference.

would be a joint Anglo-American endeavor. The proposal was forwarded to Churchill, who informally agreed to it on March 18. In early May, after the heated debates concerning future Allied strategy, Eisenhower was tasked by Marshall to begin drafting directives for the future commander of the European Theater of Operations. Under direction from Marshall, Eisenhower was not to restrict this commander the same way he had with Wavell earlier in the year. On May 23 Eisenhower flew to England in order to determine the state of the army headquarters established in London which had recently been tasked with the preparations for Bolero and Roundup and would naturally be a part of this new theater command. While there he met with the British CSC, who presented a command structure for Roundup based on the committee system. In return Eisenhower asserted that U.S. forces were suited to a unified command and that in principle the United States believed it was the only way to effectively prosecute the war. The following day he met privately with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Alan Brooke, suggesting a slight modification to the British proposal. It consisted of a supreme commander who took directives from the CCS with a combined Anglo-American staff below him. Additionally, the supreme commander would operate through his subordinate naval, air and ground force commanders. Under these conditions all naval forces would fall under a British officer, the U.S. Army would retain control of its tactical air power but strategic air forces would be assigned to the air commander, and the ground forces would be split along national lines with the British and American commanders reporting directly to the supreme commander.⁴³ Little did Eisenhower know that he was creating his own command.

After returning to Washington Eisenhower revised the directives he had previously drafted. On June 8, he presented his proposed directives to Marshall who strongly hinted that

⁴³ Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 52, 55-58.

Eisenhower would fill the position in question. Three days later Marshall confirmed Eisenhower as the commanding general of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), with Eisenhower assuming full command on June 24.⁴⁴ As Eisenhower began to establish his new command the debates over Allied strategy were continuing to rage. Prior to his return to the United States in late July, after having fruitlessly fought for a focus on the “Bolero-Roundup-Sledgehammer” proposal, Marshall notified Eisenhower that he was “tentatively designated” as “Supreme Commander” of the newly designated Operation Torch. A few weeks later, on August 14, Eisenhower was officially declared the “Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force” of the North African enterprise—the title of “Supreme Commander” having been changed to “Commander-in-Chief” during an August 2 meeting between Eisenhower and the CSC. The reasons for this decision were quite simple. The responsibilities Eisenhower had essentially bestowed upon himself as Commanding General (CG), ETOUSA fit perfectly with the points agreed upon by the CCS in late July. These stipulated that the C-in-C of Operation Torch also preside over the initial stages of Roundup and Sledgehammer allowing the ability to re-allocate resources as needed and with regards to future operations. However, and more importantly, the C-in-C was also to be American in order to give the illusion of an American enterprise.⁴⁵

This illusion was an absolute necessity to prevent Torch turning into a worse-case scenario in which the French would put up stiff resistance to the invasion. The decision to invade North Africa had been made shortly after the two-year anniversary of the Franco-German armistice on June 18, 1940, that initiated the Nazi occupation of northern France and the installment of the collaborationist Vichy Regime in the south. Under the agreement the Vichy

⁴⁴ Ibid., 59, 63.

⁴⁵ History of AFHQ, Pt. I: August-December 1942, pgs. 1-3, RG 498, NARA 2.

government, led by the aging French hero of World War I Marshal Henri Petain, was able to retain control of its colonial holdings as well as its fleet, deemed to be the second largest in Europe at the time. Fearing that this fleet would fall into the hands of Nazi Germany, thereby tipping the balance of naval power against them, the British presented the French with an ultimatum that if the French did not comply with British desires their ships would be sunk. It was this last scenario that played out at the port of Mers-el-Kebir, outside of the city of Oran in French North Africa. French refusal to abide by British demands resulted in a one-sided naval engagement and the deaths of 1,297 French sailors. The event marked the harsh implosion of Franco-British relations and for the next two years Great Britain fought “an undeclared war against Vichy French forces in Dakar, Syria, Madagascar, and Tunisia.”⁴⁶

It was against this fragmented political background that the Allies planned Torch and created the headquarters that oversaw its execution. The animosities between the former allies were to be a source of considerable contention and discord in the coming months. Despite the necessity of making Torch appear to be an American-led enterprise, Eisenhower carried his devotion to unity of command and effort in forging the headquarters that would preside over it. His devotion to this concept was also shared by his future Chief of Staff (CoS), Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith, who would remain with Eisenhower in this position for the remainder of the war. Indeed, Smith was a close friend to Eisenhower and it was through the latter’s insistence that Marshall released him from his duties as secretary to the CCS, but only after much procrastination.⁴⁷ As a result Smith would not take his position until September 15 (additionally serving as CoS, ETOUSA) with Major General Mark A. Clark holding the title in

⁴⁶ Nicholas Atkins, *Pétain, Profiles in Power* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), 79, 85-86; Barr, *Eisenhower’s Armies*, 92-93, quote from 93.

⁴⁷ Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 64, 70-71.

the interim period. At AFHQ Smith had two deputies directly below him, one from each nation: the American officer being General Alfred W. Gruenther and the British being Brigadier J. F. M. Whiteley.⁴⁸

Although Clark was initially given the title of CoS as AFHQ was being fleshed-out, his principle position was as Eisenhower's Deputy C-in-C (DC-in-C). Like Smith, Clark had been hand-picked by Eisenhower.⁴⁹ Originally the CCS had wanted a British officer to fill the billet, however, in a meeting on August 2 Eisenhower and the British CSC decided that the DC-in-C should be an American. The reasoning was that if the C-in-C were to be incapacitated, his successor would need to maintain the "fiction of a purely American enterprise." Eisenhower also requested that Clark's responsibilities include all planning for Torch. Both the British and American Chiefs of Staff agreed to Eisenhower's requests, and on August 10 Gen. Clark was designated as DC-in-C, although official announcement did not come until September 15, the day that AFHQ was officially activated.⁵⁰

The month of August was comprised of a flurry of events as Eisenhower, the CCS, and the planning staffs were formulating Operation Torch and the creation of AFHQ. Since both the C-in-C and his deputy were U.S. officers, it was decided that the organization and staff procedures of AFHQ should reflect the U.S. system.⁵¹ As such the two major tiers of the command organization were divided into General and Special Staff sections. The General Staff consisted of four sections: Personnel (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), and Supply (G-

⁴⁸ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 19, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁴⁹ Clark was the Commanding General (CG) of the II (US) Corps when Eisenhower made him the DC-in-C of AFHQ.

⁵⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 55; History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 3-4, 8, 18, RG 498, NARA 2, quote from 3.

⁵¹ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 14, RG 498, NARA 2.

4).⁵² The commanding officer of each section was then given the title of Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS). The general function of the General Staff in general and the ACoS more specifically is described in a staff memorandum issued on September 7, 1942. It reads:

The duties of the General Staff with troops shall be to render professional aid and assistance to the general officers about them; to act as their agents in harmonizing the plans duties and operations of the various organizations and services under their jurisdiction, preparing detailed instructions for the execution of the plans of the Commanding General, and in supervising the execution of such instructions.

As agents of the Commanding General, Assistant Chiefs of Staff will take action on all matters referred to them by other sections of the General Staff, the Special Staff, or by the Chief of Staff, in accordance with law, regulations and approved policies of the Commanding General. They will keep the Chief of Staff posted on the activities of their section. When Assistants of the Chief of Staff believe necessary to announce a new policy, or make an exception to or modify an existing policy, they will, before action is taken, submit the papers with recommendations to the Chief of Staff.

In essence, the General Staff sections constituted the main general components of the headquarters, while the Special Staffs constituted the more specialized sub-sections. Therefore, a General Staff section would be comprised of multiple Special Staff sections.⁵³

It was through the General and Special staff sections that Eisenhower sought to institute a command based on “real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.” To achieve this, he decided to integrate the British and U.S. staff sections as much as possible. For Eisenhower this was an absolute necessity; he believed “that anything less than complete integration of effort would spell certain disaster.” In order to facilitate the command that

⁵² Organizational charts that provide a necessary visual aid for the structural breakdown of AFHQ, during 1942 and 1943, have been provided as a series of Appendices. Also included are two personnel rosters that show key differences in the make-up of AFHQ in the same years, as well as two maps which give scope to the boundaries of the theater command, North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, in 1943 and 1944. All references to these charts and maps will be cited in-text from here.

⁵³ Allied Force Headquarters, Staff Memorandum (SM) 10; AFHQ Staff Memorandums; Records of the Special Staff; Records of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, 1942-1947, RG 492, Box 1562; NARA 2. From here on cited as “AFHQ...RSS, RG 492, Box #, NARA 2” as the sub-group contains multiple series. For example, “AFHQ Special Orders” and “AFHQ General Orders” are also found in the Records of the Special Staff subgroup.

Eisenhower envisioned it was necessary to implement what the official history of AFHQ calls the “principle of balanced personnel,” or a one-to-one match of British and American personnel in the sections that were to be integrated.⁵⁴

Although I will present a more in-depth analysis of the General Staff sections shortly, for the sake of clarity it seems pertinent to provide a general overview of the “division of labor.” It was decided that all army, navy, and air force commanders and staff from both nations were to be subordinate to the C-in-C. Administration, or the General Staff sections of G-2 and G-4, and all air services fell under the purview of the British. This left G-1 and G-3 as well as many of the technical services, considered Special Staffs, under the purview of the Americans.⁵⁵ This policy also applied to the ACoS as well, whose “opposite number” was to be from the other nationality and given the title “deputy ACoS” (DACoS). To keep parity between the two nations in an integrated headquarters the DACoS was required to be an officer of “equal or near equal rank” as the ACoS.⁵⁶ Yet, despite this division the underlying “principle of complete integration was applied throughout the General Staff Sections” and “the best man was assigned to each job, irrespective of nationality.”⁵⁷ This last point was the only exception to the principle of balanced personnel.

Implementation of these principles was not without difficulties and hurdles to overcome. Almost as soon as planning began, issues arose with the level of authority that the C-in-C would possess. An August 14th directive from the CCS did not state whether or not the C-in-C would

⁵⁴ “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch: North African Campaign, 1942-1943,” pg. 1; AFHQ Microfilm, File Number (FN): SGS 486.4; RG 331; NARA 2. From here on cited as “C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,” pg. ##, RG 331, NARA 2; History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 13, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁵⁵ Barr, *Eisenhower’s Armies*, 20.

⁵⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 14, RG 498, NARA 2, quote from same.

⁵⁷ “C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,” pg. 2, RG 331, NARA 2.

possess direct authority over all naval, air, and ground forces participating in Torch. This issue came to a head after orders were drafted for Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, commander of the newly created British First Army, and future commander of the Eastern Task Force of Torch. The orders gave Anderson the ability to circumvent Eisenhower and go straight to the British War Office if he disagreed with any orders Eisenhower gave to him during the operation. After Eisenhower expressed his objection to this loophole in his command authority, the CSC drafted a revised order and sent to Eisenhower before being given to Anderson. It stated that British commanders could appeal to the War Office only under extreme circumstances given that no battlefield opportunity was squandered, nor any Allied forces put in danger. It also made clear that British commanders must inform the C-in-C of their intentions and reasons first. Eisenhower's high degree of satisfaction with the revision prompted him to forward a copy of it to the U.S. War Department "in the hope that it will serve as a model in future cases of this kind."⁵⁸ Although the matter was ultimately settled it took a considerable amount of time, with the revised order having been sent to Anderson a mere two weeks before the invasion actually took place. Additionally, the air forces were kept separate along national lines due to objections by the British and American air commanders on the grounds that the operation covered too large of a geographical area. As a result, the respective commanders reported directly to Eisenhower.⁵⁸ Thus, it was not until late October that Eisenhower's authority over the combat arms involved in Torch was defined in explicit terms.

The principles on which AFHQ would operate were those that drove the Combined Planning Staff, the body of British and U.S. planners commissioned by the CCS after they made

⁵⁸ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 4-5, 8-10, RG 498, NARA 2, quote from 10; Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 71.

the decision to pursue Torch. The CCS charged the planners with the operational planning of Torch and drafting the organizational blueprint of AFHQ. The Combined Planning Staff came together under the command of General Gruenther on August 4, after the British and American planners moved into a single location at Norfolk House in St. James Square, London.⁵⁹

Numbering only twelve men in all, the group would also eventually be incorporated into the operations section (G-3) of AFHQ. On August 10, Clark took control of the planning staff as part of his duties as DC-in-C.⁶⁰ They were not the only ones to occupy the building, however, sharing it with the planning staffs of ETOUSA.

The atmosphere inside Norfolk House according to General Lucian Truscott was one of bewilderment and confusion. “Some of the [planners] had rooms which were reasonably well furnished with office equipment. But many were assigned to long, almost empty halls and empty rooms, through which [other planners] wandered in varying degrees of uncertainty.”⁶¹ Not surprisingly, the British came to the merger with much of the operational planning for Torch having already been completed by their Future Planning Staff between July 18-25. Despite this, debates arose concerning the conduct of the operation, the most prominent being over the locations of the landings.

The directive passed down from the CCS stated the overall objective was the seizure of North Africa in its entirety, with the intention of assisting the British Eighth Army fighting in Egypt and Libya. On August 9 Eisenhower submitted his first operational plan proposing landings at Casablanca in Morocco, which was seen by the Americans as a safeguard against a

⁵⁹ Located in St. James Square, London the building (now an office building) has a plaque commemorating it as the location of AFHQ prior to its departure to North Africa.

⁶⁰ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 15-17, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁶¹ Lucian Truscott, *Command Missions: A Personal Story* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1954), 56-57.

possible Axis attack through Spain; at the Algerian cities of Algiers and Oran; and a landing directly in Tunisia at Bône, the latter being necessary for securing Tunisia before the Axis could establish a bridgehead that could threaten the entire operation. However, a debate was ignited as the British rejected the Casablanca landing site as “unfeasible and irrelevant,” adding that it would significantly delay the invasion. For the British it was imperative to have landings in Tunisia. The U.S. counter-argument was that a landing at Casablanca prevented the lines of communication from being cut at the Straights of Gibraltar by Axis forces moving through Spain. The revised plan submitted on August 22 removed Casablanca, although Eisenhower requested additional forces to add it back on the list. The resulting feud stirred up feelings that the U. S. military was not dedicated to the operation, given that they were no longer willing to take great risks as they had been with Sledgehammer. The resulting stalemate again required the intervention of Churchill and Roosevelt to make the final call. The two heads of state struck a deal that put Casablanca back on the list and to keep Oran, at the urging of Roosevelt for reasons of domestic politics, and made Algiers a firm commitment, at the behest of Churchill; but there would be no landings in Tunisia.⁶² Additionally, it was not until October 8 that orders designated task forces for each location. The Western Task Force, commanded by Major General George S. Patton Jr., was comprised of all U.S. forces using U.S. ships. The Center Task Force was also comprised entirely of U.S. forces, but using ships from the British Royal Navy. The Eastern Task Force was a mix of both British and U.S. forces under the command of an American officer, Major General Charles W. Ryder, for the initial invasion phase in order to maintain the

⁶² Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 202-203; Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 28-30; O'Hara, *TORCH*, 47, 49-51.

American façade. It was only after the French capitulated that Anderson would take control of the British component, First Army, and push east into Tunisia.⁶³

As the planners worked on the operational details and the debates raged over the landing areas, Colonel Ben M. Sawbridge was devising the internal structure of AFHQ. The original organization chart completed by Sawbridge on August 26th represented, more or less, what Eisenhower had envisioned for the headquarters, and little changed by the time it departed for North Africa that November (see Appendices A and B). During this time the headquarters began to take shape as individuals from British and American units located in Great Britain began to fill the headquarters personnel roster. Due to the rushed nature of the operation, this occurred while the planning for both the operation and the headquarters that would prosecute it were still in progress.⁶⁴ According to Alexander Lovelace, this frantic activity resulted in a period of “plunder” on behalf of AFHQ.⁶⁵ While Lovelace’s assertion that the U.S. Army “robbed Peter to pay Paul” in order to make AFHQ function is not inherently wrong, it ignores the severe reality of the situation. Within roughly three months Operation Torch was not only planned and prepared, but the command organization that would conduct it was also created—a truly herculean undertaking in both regards. With the invasion of France postponed, priorities naturally shifted. Indeed, the commanders that saw their best officers stripped from their commands for what appeared to be a potentially disastrous endeavor were undoubtedly upset. As Lovelace points out there were indeed strong objections. Despite this, the so called “plundering” of other commands for the creation of AFHQ was a decision born of necessity.

⁶³ O’Hara, *TORCH*, 54-55; “C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,” pgs. 6-7, RG 331, NARA 2.

⁶⁴ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 16-17, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁶⁵ Alexander G. Lovelace, “Hughes’ War: The Allied High Command Through the Eyes of General Everett S. Hughes,” (Masters Thesis, The George Washington University, 2013), accessed August 13, 2017 http://etd.gelman.gwu.edu/etd_11880/11880.pdf, 14.

However, personnel assignments did create some confusion. A rather important, and interesting, case in point is that of Colonel Everett S. Hughes. Originally Hughes was brought to England to serve as Chief Ordnance Officer of the Service of Supply (SOS), ETOUSA, commanded by Major General John C. H. Lee. Shortly thereafter, in July, he was appointed as Lee's Chief of Staff. However, on August 11 Hughes was approached by General Alfred Gruenther, one of Eisenhower's deputy chiefs of staff, who informed him he might be placed on the planning staff for Torch. Recounting the encounter Hughes wrote, "Al Gruenther says that if I am half as good as Ike says I am I am a superman," alluding to Hughes's outstanding logistical competency. Hughes and Eisenhower also shared a long history. The two men, and their wives, first met in Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926 while Hughes was an instructor at the General Service School and they remained friends thereafter.⁶⁶ While this paves the way for the assumption that favoritism was involved, the fact that Hughes remained a Colonel until late September, and a note discussing his lack of promotion, belies that notion. On September 2 Hughes wrote "[I] have decided that I'll never be a BG [brigadier general] because of that poor report Wesson rendered me at the APG [Aberdeen Proving Grounds]."⁶⁷ It was not until August 17 that Hughes was brought to AFHQ to serve as the deputy to the Chief Administrative Officer, despite having been told by Clark seven days prior that he was to take command of the G-1 section. Despite this formal change in position, Hughes still held the position of CoS of SOS, ETOUSA putting him

⁶⁶ Ibid., 3, 7, 11, 13-14. Lovelace has laid out Hughes's logistical abilities in a concise and detailed manner and it is in this description that he describes the objections to the officer "plundering." Quote from The Papers of Everett S. Hughes; "Personal;" Folder: Diary Notes (1942-1956); Box I, Container II; Everett Straight Hughes Papers (ESHP); Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. From here on cited as "Hughes...Box #, Container #, ESHP."

⁶⁷ Hughes, "Personal," Folder: Diary Notes (1942-1956), Box I, Container II, ESHP. I relied on Lovelace's own use of the quote to decipher what "A.P.G." stood for. His, however, comes from Hughes' diary whereas mine comes from a typed version of specific diary entries.

under two separate commands that were both technically under the purview of Eisenhower.⁶⁸

The air was partially, if not adequately, cleared on August 19, when the CCS relieved Eisenhower of his responsibilities for Roundup and Sledgehammer in order to center his attention on Torch. Eisenhower also shifted some of his responsibilities for ETOUSA by appointing Major General Russel P. Hartle as Deputy Theater Commander so that once Torch was underway ETOUSA would still have a commander.⁶⁹ While this helped lighten the burden on Eisenhower, who had a very large burden to bear indeed, it did not clarify the situation much for Hughes.

The situation during the preparation period of Torch and the creation of AFHQ created complex inroads among the other U.S. commands in the U.K. as well. There was also a degree of complexity bringing the British component into the fold. What was to become the staff of the newly created British First Army was also actively engaged in the formation of AFHQ and the planning of Torch. Many of these staff members were originally slated to comprise part of the British component of AFHQ before being shifted to First Army, and their positions would shift again after the invasion.⁷⁰ Due to circumstances such as this, much of the British representation during the planning phase came from frequent meetings with the War Cabinet and other ministries (see Appendix C). This complicated series of personnel transfers leads to the question of how integrated was AFHQ actually? Indeed, the organizational charts indicate that the United States held a dominate position within AFHQ, with many of the senior command positions being held by an American officer. However, appearances do not tell the whole story. In order to truly

⁶⁸ Everett Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 27, 1942; Folder: Correspondence (Sept.-Oct. 1942); Box II, Container I; ESHP and, "Personal," Folder, Diary Notes (1942-1956), Box I, Container II, ESHP.

⁶⁹ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, 7-8, NARA 2.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 23.

ascertain the true integrated nature of the headquarters we must dive deeper into its structural make-up.

The best place to begin is with what can be considered the “primary organization chart” (see Appendix B). This chart gives a basic understanding as to the core of AFHQ’s composition. The issue with this chart, as immensely helpful as it is, is that it is rather misleading—i.e. the administrative General Staff Sections (G-1 and G-4) of AFHQ are indicated as being headed by an American officer. In reality, all administrative staffs for both the British and Americans were neither integrated nor independent. Rather they operated in parallel, with their prior structures kept intact, and their efforts coordinated between the heads of the respective sections.⁷¹ For example, instead of a completely integrated supply chain, the British and Americans both operated according to their respective doctrines, with larger efforts being coordinated in a joint manner through the British and American section chiefs. The reasoning was that the administrative systems of the both the British and U.S. armies were so vastly different that it was impossible to merge them together without significantly degrading their efficiency. This prompted the creation of a new position that would preside over both G-1 and G-4 (see Appendix B), titled the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The CAO was to ensure the highest degree of coordination between the administrative staffs of both nationalities and “to insure the fullest use of common stocks.”⁷² In addition to this the CAO also had multiple duties concerning British forces only. The responsibility was given to Major General Humphrey M. Gale, who took charge of this billet with his arrival at Norfolk House on August 11. His title was not officially

⁷¹ Ibid., 30

⁷² “C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,” pg. 2, RG 331, NARA 2, quote from same.

designated until roughly a month later, on September 15.⁷³ In light of this, Hughes's move from potential head of G-1 to Deputy CAO can be seen as a promotion of sorts.

With Hughes as a "deputy" to the CAO, the position of G-1 went to Colonel Sawbridge, the brain behind the organizational setup of AFHQ. Like Hughes, Sawbridge double-hatted as well, albeit for a much shorter period. Before his appointment to AFHQ he had been serving as Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS) of G-1, ETOUSA, and remained in this position until September 26. The activation of G-1, AFHQ unofficially began with the arrival of Sawbridge at Norfolk House on August 16. His British counterpart was Brigadier Vincent J. E. Westropp, whose position of Deputy Adjutant General was activated a few days later, on August 19 (see Appendix D). The official activation of G-1 as an operating General Staff section of AFHQ was on September 15. As stated previously, all matters of personnel were coordinated between these two men, with general oversight coming from the CAO. The functions of G-1 consisted primarily of "planning, policy formulation, and supervision of personnel under the command of the Allied C-in-C" and also in-theater sanitation. Although both the British and the American halves began operating around the same time, their full personnel complement was not the same during 1942. Many of the British personnel slated for G-1 were also serving as part of the administrative staff of the British First Army and so they would not officially be brought onto the AFHQ administrative staff until the following year.⁷⁴

As previously stated, G-4 (supply and evacuation) operated in parallel fashion similar to the G-1, with each nation operating its own supply system but larger matters being coordinated through the heads of the respective section (see Appendix G). G-4 began operating with the

⁷³ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 32, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 41-42, quote from 42; History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pg. 255, RG 498, NARA 2.

appointment of Brigadier R. G. Lewis as Deputy Quartermaster General (DQMG) by the War Office on August 11. As DQGC, Lewis was in charge of all British supply, or “Q,” issues. The American side began functioning the next day on August 12 with the arrival of its ACoS, Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen. The responsibilities of G-4 as a whole ranged from procurement, distribution, and maintenance of all supplies; procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance of all structures (except fortifications); all matters concerning the personnel involved in these tasks; and the evacuation of all supplies and personnel if the headquarters was forced to relocate. As with the G-1 section, during the remainder of 1942 the British side was rather hollow, and the remaining subordinate staffs were brought into the fold in the new year.⁷⁵

Differences in British and American General Staff sections of supply required a compromise that led to the creation of a new and separate section. For the U.S. Army, railways, roads, and waterways fell under the jurisdiction of a Special Staff Section of G-4. However, British doctrine recognized these matters as deserving their own general staff section, titled “Movements and Transportation” (see Appendix H). In order to keep things as closely integrated and efficient as possible, the British separation was followed and all matters concerning rails, roads, and waterways were placed under a separate “Movements and Transportation” General Staff section. Thus, AFHQ had both a G-4 and a Movements and Transportation section, each on an equal footing to the other as far as seniority within the hierarchy. The new section consisted of the U.S. Transportation Section, British “Q” Movements, and British Transportation Services. It began functioning, like all the other general staff sections, in the first half of August with the arrival of the Chief of Section, (British) Colonel A. T. de Rhe Philipe on August 10.⁷⁶ The

⁷⁵ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 51-52, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pgs. 54, 57, and Pt. II, Sec. 3, pg. 433. I have decided to use the billet title given in the AFHQ official history as it simplifies the overall work, given an already burdensome number of acronyms, and to reduce confusion. For example, the organization chart for the Movements and Transportation Section provide a lengthier title of “Chief

section was formally activated on September 15. As previously stated, the section dealt with all matters concerning rails, roads, and waterways, but also included the transportation of men and material by air as well. The functions leading up to the invasion, however, were largely limited to “planning, policy formulation, allocation of facilities, and co-ordination of all executive action.” During this time, the control of all transportation matters rested with the movements and transportation sections of the three task forces. Given that the two national services had no choice other than to utilize the same means and modes of transportation, it was common practice for the British and American officers to work at adjoining desks.⁷⁷ This practice included Chief of Section de Rhe Phillipe and the chief of the U.S. Transportation Section, Colonel Frank Ross (whose position was activated when Ross arrived in Algiers on November 20), working together in a manner like the G-1 and G-4, despite the U.S. section chief being technically subordinate.⁷⁸

G-2 (intelligence) began functioning at Norfolk House on August 11 and was officially activated September 15, the same day as many of the other general staff sections. Its functions can be summed up as control over all aspects of operational intelligence (collection, interpretation, dissemination, etc.) and counter-intelligence (preservation of secrecy, censorship,

of Movements and Transportation (DQMG).” I have done the same for the billet title of the Chief of the U.S. Transportation Section, which will be referred to as the “Chief of Transportation.”

⁷⁷ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 51, 54-56, RG 498, NARA 2, quote from 55. The reason why there is two British sub-sections to one U.S. is that the U.S. Transportation Section dealt with all matters concerning what was to be moved and how, while the British system split the two into separate staffs.

⁷⁸ The official history of AFHQ does not list a name for the U.S. Chief of Transportation in the period of August to November 20, 1942. This is most likely due to the responsibility of transportation having been delegated to the three task forces created for the invasion, and so the position was not necessary until post-invasion. It is also unclear as to whether or not de Rhe Phillipe had an American deputy directly under him that was not the Chief of Transportation. Since this would create an unnecessary layer in the hierarchy it seems reasonable that the position did not exist and that the Chief of Transportation acted as the “deputy.” This assumption is also substantiated by an official Army interview conducted with Major General George C. Stewart, who became Chief of Transportation in 1943. “U.S. Army Transportation Oral History: General George C. Stewart interview by Captain Tymothy W. Caddell,” pg. 10; 1985; accessed May 20, 2017, <http://www.transportation.army.mil/history/GOinterviews.html>. From here on cited as “Trans. Oral History: George C. Stewart,” pg. #.” A PDF file of the interview can be downloaded from the provided link. Referenced page numbers begin with the first page of the document labeled “Resume of Service Career.”

etc.).⁷⁹ G-2 was an integrated section, unlike G-1 and G-4, and so the principle of British and American personnel working side-by-side at every level was followed as much as possible (see Appendix E). Thus, the section was run by the ACoS G-2, Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, and his DACoS, U.S. Colonel Theodore E. T. Haley.⁸⁰ An artillery officer by trade, Mockler-Ferryman became the chief of the intelligence section dealing with Germany in 1939 at the rank of colonel. In July 1940, he was reassigned to General Headquarters, Home Forces—which was tasked with preparing for the possibility of a German invasion of England—and promoted to brigadier. “I was disappointed,” he wrote after the war about these appointments. “Intelligence is rather a backwater and difficult to escape [from]” (although his feelings towards being in intelligence could have been tainted by his experience in North Africa). Instead, he had hoped to command an artillery brigade or regiment, a position he finally held, if only for a brief period of time, as commander of the Royal Artillery in Scotland from February to August 1942, stating “I thought I had [escaped].”⁸¹ According to Mockler-Ferryman the working relationship between

⁷⁹ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 44-45, RG 498, NARA 2. Counter-intelligence was also known as “security.” The pages in this note contain a more detailed list of the functions of G-2.

⁸⁰ Ibid. Haley’s position as DACoS, G-2 proved to be one of the more elusive in researching AFHQ. The official history does not mention Haley by name and ensuring his position required the cross-referencing of several archival documents. For example, he is mentioned as an incoming officer for G-2 in a special order issued by AFHQ on 18 September 1942, but his position is not elaborated on. A roster of officers in AFHQ was distributed on November 1 placing Haley as the second highest-ranking officer in G-2, allowing for the reasonable assumption that he was the DACoS. It was not until researching the records at the British National Archives at Kew that I was able to confirm his position with a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from Mockler-Ferryman, dated January 27, 1943, on the organization of G-2. The personnel roster given as the second appendix verifies his title of DACoS, although not in those exact terms. However, I was unable to determine how much longer Haley remained in AFHQ after January. For the September special order see: AFHQ, Special Order (SO) 4; AFHQ Special Orders; RSS, RG 492, Box 1545, NARA 2; for the November memorandum see: “Memorandum to Chiefs of General and Special Staff Sections: Roster of Officers, 1 November 1942;” AFHQ Microfilm, FN AG 330.31/008; RG 331; NARA 2. For the January 27 memorandum see: “Memorandum for Chief of Staff: Intelligence Organization at AFHQ, 27 January 1943;” Records Created or Inherited by the War Office, Armed Forces, Judge Advocate General, and related bodies(WO); War Office: Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theatre: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War (WO 204); Subseries: Organisation of G-2 Section; WO 204/941; TNA. From here on documents cited from this record group (WO 204) will be cited as “[document name...]; [subseries name]; WO 204/[subseries number], TNA.”

⁸¹ The Private Papers of Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman CB CBE MC; “The Memoirs of Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman CB CBE MC,” pgs. 70-82; Documents 11184, Box P323; Documents and Sound Section, Imperial War Museum, London, UK. From here on cited as “Private Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, ‘Memoirs,’ pg. #, IWM.” Quotes from The Papers of Brigadier Eric (1896-1978) Mockler-Ferryman; “North Africa,” pg. 1; Folder:

British and American personnel within G-2 before the invasion was bumpy and issues did arise, but he was surprised at “how well quickly the two nations fitted together.” For those who could not work with their counterparts they were “weeded out.”⁸²

Of all the general staff sections of AFHQ, G-3, also a fully integrated section, began functioning the earliest, starting on August 4, the day the Combined Planning Staff was assembled at Norfolk House (see Appendix F). The section’s chief, U.S. Brigadier General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,⁸³ did not arrive until August 15, and even then his principle job was acting Deputy CoS until September 15, when Gen. Bedell Smith took over from Clark as CoS, AFHQ.⁸⁴ An artillery officer by trade like his G-2 counter-part, Lemnitzer was a student at the Army War College as war began to break out in Europe, and having graduated from there he was pulled into the War Plans Division of the War Department’s General Staff where he was first acquainted with what would become Operation Torch. In 1942, and prior to his posting at AFHQ, he was sent to England as the commanding general of the 34th Anti-Aircraft Brigade. However, it was his experience and prior work in the War Plans Division that made him known to Eisenhower as an officer competent enough to oversee the G-3 section of AFHQ.⁸⁵ This experience proved invaluable given the myriad of duties for which the section was responsible,

Miscellaneous; Liddell Hart Military Archives, Kings College, London, UK. From here on cited as “Mockler-Ferryman, ..., Pg. #, KCLMA.” The latter source contains draft sections of the printed memoirs, to which the document cited above belongs, located at the Imperial War Museum.

⁸² Private Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, “Memoirs,” pg. 83, IWM, quotes from same.

⁸³ It seems that Lemnitzer’s experience at AFHQ benefited him greatly in the post-war period. He continued to rise in rank and billet, becoming the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960-1962, C-in-C, European Command from 1962-1963, and then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe from 1963-1969. See “Obituary of General Lyman Lemnitzer;” Folder: Obituary, as Appeared in West Point Alumni Association Magazine, Jan. 1990, Colonel R. M. Stegmaier, USA, (Ret); Lemnitzer Papers, Box 2; U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle PA; and Albin Krebs, “Lyman Lemnitzer, 89, Dies; U.S. General and War Hero,” November 13, 1988, National Edition.

⁸⁴ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 18, 47, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁸⁵ “Senior Officers Debriefing Program (SODP): Conversations between General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Bickston,” pg. 23; 1972-1973; Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, 1960-1990, Box 1; USAHEC; from here on cited as “SODP: Lyman Lemnitzer, pg. #, Lemnitzer Papers, USAHEC;” Col. Robert M. Stegmaier, “Article on General Lemnitzer, 1989,” pg. 4; Folder: “Article (Final Draft) on General Lemnitzer;” Lemnitzer Papers, Box 2; USAHEC.

ranging from the organization of headquarters and field units; the planning for, and supervision of, all operations undertaken by all ground combat forces under AFHQ; and the training of all units that operated under AFHQ's command.⁸⁶ Lemnitzer's "opposite number" was Brigadier Frank W. Vogel, also an artillery officer by trade, whose position was only formally announced on September 16.⁸⁷ However, the toll of the war struck G-3 early on when Vogel was killed in a plane crash returning to Gibraltar from North Africa shortly after the invasion in mid-November.⁸⁸ His replacement, Brigadier C. S. Sugden, was approved by the War Office that month and remained as DACoS, G-3 well into 1943.⁸⁹

Part 3 – The Move to Africa and the “Race for Tunis”

Given the short time-frame from planning to departure, preparations for the move of AFHQ began before the official activation of the headquarters was even announced. On September 7, roughly a week before AFHQ's actual activation, the decision was made to establish a temporary command post (CP) for the invasion. The British base at Gibraltar, nicknamed the “Rock,” was chosen as the location for the CP in what Eisenhower called “the

⁸⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, 48-49, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁸⁷ AFHQ, SO 2, AFHQ Special Orders, RSS, RG 492, Box 1545, NARA 2.

⁸⁸ “British Officers in African Crash,” *Courier and Advertiser* (Dundee, Scotland), Monday, November 16, 1942, Issue 27910; Cable to Smith from Lemnitzer, November 1942; G3-Operations Subsection; WO 204/1050, TNA. Concerning the latter source, the wording of the cable reads “Vogel returns by flying boat tomorrow weather permitting.” The cable is addressed to “ABFOR,” the designation given to the rear echelon of AFHQ in London, from AFCP (Allied Force Command Post), the temporary CP at Gibraltar. For the designation of AFHQ, London see: Allied Force Command Post, Memorandum 6, 11 November 1942; AFHQ Microfilm, FN AG 300.6; RG 331; NARA 2. For his service with AFHQ Vogel was posthumously awarded the Legion of Merit, Officer Degree by Roosevelt, however, due to British government policy his wife could not publicly be awarded with the medal; “Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to Mrs. Frank W. Vogel, 14 August 1943,” S.A.C.’s Secretariat Records Section; WO 204/280, TNA

⁸⁹ Cable to Eisenhower from Smith, November 1942, WO 204/1050, TNA; Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diaries of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR: Naval Aid to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 390. The latter source indicates that Sugden remained in G-3 until at least August of 1943.

most dismal setting we occupied during the war.”⁹⁰ Codenamed Tuxford, it put the command element of AFHQ in a better position to coordinate the operation and maintain communication with the rear echelon still in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the port and airfield at Gibraltar were absolutely vital for the success of the landings, serving as launch points for two of the task forces and a significant amount of the air support for the invasion.

However, this decision was not without immense risks. The components of AFHQ that occupied “the Rock” were the top echelons of AFHQ—Eisenhower and his staff, the commanders of the three services, their operations staffs, and those necessary for communications.⁹¹ This concentration of senior personnel was an immense risk given that the Spanish government was sympathetic to Nazi Germany. This raised the possibility that the Spanish could simply let the Germans move through Spain to attack the fortress. This led to further concerns during the debates over the landing areas that raised the prospect of having the line of communication to London cut off if the entire invasion force went through the Strait of Gibraltar.⁹² Although the latter concern was addressed with the inclusion of Casablanca, the former was unavoidable; there were no alternatives. Neither the United States nor the British held any other viable location between the United Kingdom and North Africa.⁹³ The advance CP at Gibraltar was absolutely critical to the invasion.

The advanced CP technically began functioning in late October, during the landing area debates, as various personnel began arriving at Gibraltar. The official activation date, however,

⁹⁰ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 96-97, RG 498, NARA 2; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 95.

⁹¹ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 94-96, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁹² Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 202; O'Hara, *TORCH*, 47-52; I.S.O. Playfair, J.C. Molony, F.C. Flynn, and T.P. Gleave, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Vol. IV, *The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1966), 114-115.

⁹³ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 95.

was not until November 5, with the arrival of Eisenhower, Clark, the commanding officers of the services and some of the General Staff officers.⁹⁴ Of the latter only Major General Gale (CAO) and Colonel Sawbridge (G-1) remained in London when Rear Echelon, AFHQ was activated on November 2.⁹⁵ Out of the six B-17 “Flying Fortresses” that carried Eisenhower and his entourage to Gibraltar only one did not make it on November 5. The plane carrying Generals Doolittle (commander of the U.S. 12th Air Force) and Lemnitzer initially had to turn back due to engine trouble. On its second attempt the following day the B-17 was intercepted by three German Ju-88 Stuka dive bombers on patrol. Fortunately, they had been nearing the limits of their fuel and were only able to inflict minimal damage on the B-17 but wounded the co-pilot, who Doolittle replaced for the remainder of the trip to Gibraltar. Despite the nature of the flight and its passengers, which required it to be stripped of weapons and ammunition, the Stuka attack did not go without response. Noticing that a .50 caliber machinegun and ammunition had been left in the radio compartment, Lemnitzer mounted it and began returning fire. According to his posthumous biography he was able to shoot down one Stuka and severely damaged another.⁹⁶ Given the limited space in the “rabbit warren of offices under the Rock,” the rest of the headquarters was piecemealed among the convoys slated for the operation.⁹⁷ Since the initial convoys that headed to North Africa carried the invasion forces, limited space was available for

⁹⁴ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 97-98, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁹⁵ Allied Force Headquarters, “Memorandum on Establishment of Rear Echelon,” AFHQ Microfilm, FN: A.G. 323.35-23, RG 331, NARA 2.

⁹⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 98, RG 498, NARA 2; L. James Binder, *Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time* (Washington: Brassey’s, 1997), 92-93. Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 93-94; Private Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, “Memoirs,” pg. 84, IWM. This particular incident has produced an interesting claim by Mockler-Ferryman. In his draft memoir he states that the B-17 carrying Eisenhower had missed the turn into the Strait of Gibraltar and continued to travel down the African coast for some distance before turning around and heading for Gibraltar. While it seems like an absurd comment, without knowing the weather conditions during the flight it could be possible that there was no visual contact between the aircraft. However, no other source that I have consulted makes any mention of such an incident transpiring. For Mockler-Ferryman’s claim see: Mockler-Ferryman, “North Africa,” pg. 5, Folder: “Miscellaneous,” KCLMA.

⁹⁷ Quote from Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 94.

any non-combat related personnel of AFHQ. Thus, the various staff sections made bids for the spaces available, which then could be petitioned by the task force commanders. What portions of AFHQ that shipped out with the invasion forces, or that did not move to Gibraltar, trickled into Africa with the follow-on convoys from the United Kingdom.⁹⁸

The only major dispute that seemed to occur in the brief period that the officers inhabited Gibraltar was the meeting between Eisenhower and French General Henri Giraud. The meeting was part of the larger effort that had begun in October to reduce French resistance to the landings in North Africa, and an “earnest conviction held in both London and Washington that...Giraud could lead the French...into the Allied camp.”⁹⁹ On November 7 Giraud was brought to Gibraltar to meet with Eisenhower to continue discussing these matters, which developed into a long and at times tense discussion about Giraud’s role in the new Allied offensive. Giraud apparently believed that he was to take command of *all* allied forces in North Africa after the invasion began, a suggestion rejected out of hand by the Allies. The following morning, as the invasion was underway, Giraud agreed to Eisenhower’s authority as C-in-C of the Allied forces, for which Eisenhower agreed to recognize him as C-in-C of all French forces, as well as governor of all French holdings, in North Africa.¹⁰⁰ Tensions remained high nevertheless. Eisenhower sums up succinctly what must have been a period of immense tension and anxiousness in the days leading up to the invasion. He stated that “True, there was tenseness—one could feel it in every little cave makeshifting [sic] for an office. It was natural. Within a matter of hours, the Allies would know the initial fate of their first combined offensive...of the

⁹⁸ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 94-97, RG 498, NARA 2.

⁹⁹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 99. See also Arthur L. Funk, *The Politics of TORCH: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch, 1942*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974) for a more in-depth analysis on the political situation surrounding Operation Torch.

¹⁰⁰ Funk, *The Politics of TORCH*, 189, 227-229; George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), 190-191.

war.” The officers of AFHQ did not sit idly by either, with preparations and planning for the post-invasion period still left to do. Yet, this planning still rested on the invasion’s success, no doubt adding an immense sense of frustration to an already tense situation.¹⁰¹ Although one can imagine the tense feelings that must have permeated throughout Gibraltar, that no major argument erupted at the Rock seems to be explainable, partially at least, by the imminence of the invasion and the uncertainty of what lay ahead. On the one hand, any disputes that remained unresolved from the previous months were probably subdued in the anticipation of whether or not it even mattered anymore. If the invasion failed, everyone would be held accountable. Alternatively, the disputes that may have begun to rear their nasty heads while attempting to plan the post-invasion phase depended on the near-infinite number of outcomes that could follow the invasion. For the time being any and all disputes were put on hold until the events of November 8, D-Day, transpired.

The final destination of AFHQ in the move from London to North Africa was Algiers, codenamed Hamble, the capital city of French colonial Algeria. Preparations for the move began on September 28 with AFHQ Headquarters Commandant, Colonel John W. Ramsey, Jr., affirming that the Saint George Hotel would be a suitable location for the core of the headquarters. The remaining sections, however, would have to be dispersed throughout the city. Subsequently, General Clark notified the Eastern Task Force commander, General Anderson, that the hotel was needed by D-Day + 7 or sooner in order to begin setting up the headquarters.¹⁰² Since some components of AFHQ had been loaded onto the transports ferrying the three task forces from the United Kingdom, the first headquarters components of AFHQ

¹⁰¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 96-97, quote from 96.

¹⁰² History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 96, RG 498, NARA 2; Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean*, 30.

reached Algiers on November 8. They had been attached to the Eastern Task Force, commanded by General Ryder at the time, which had announced the city in Allied hands that night—Ryders command of the Task force then passed to Anderson for the advance on Tunisia. The following day two B-17's transported General Clark and a small contingent of the Gibraltar CP needed to oversee the conduct of the push towards Tunis and to conduct “anticipated negotiations with French officials.”¹⁰³ As with Eisenhower's encounter with Giraud at Gibraltar, Clark's dealings with the French officers in North Africa were fraught and tense. In fact, the “anticipated negotiations” in Algiers voided those conducted in Gibraltar as the political situation on the ground proved much more problematic and complex than anticipated. Giraud had lost his credibility among the French officers who had previously been willing to back him in his bid for control over French North Africa. This was partly due to the complication of Admiral Jean François Darlan, C-in-C of all Vichy forces, being in Algiers at the time of the invasion to visit his son who had been stricken with polio earlier in the year.¹⁰⁴ On the night of November 9, General Alphonse Juin, commander of all French ground forces in North Africa, was able to persuade Giraud to abandon his aspirations of presiding over the whole of North Africa and to accept a purely military position. This put Giraud effectively on the sidelines as Clark arrived to establish a ceasefire with the French. Despite these political complications, for both the Allies and Vichy France, Clark and Darlan agreed to a ceasefire on the night of November 10. Hostilities did not officially end, however, until the following day.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 103; History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 98-99, RG 498, NARA 2; Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Funk, *The Politics of TORCH*, 10, 234. Michael Howard, *Grand Strategy*, Vol. IV, *August 1942 – September 1943*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1972), 172-173.

¹⁰⁵ Anthony Clayton, *Three Marshals of France: Leadership after Trauma* (London: Brassey's (UK), 1992), 67. Funk, *The Politics of TORCH*, 237-239. See Funk for an in-depth and substantial analysis of main “movers and shakers” of the political intrigues before and during Torch. His analysis however ends with the closing weeks of

Over the next two months the remaining elements of AFHQ were brought to Algiers with the advanced CP at Gibraltar and the rear echelon in London deactivating on November 25 and December 25 respectively. The final component of AFHQ to reach Algiers, from the rear echelon, did not arrive in until January 9, 1943.¹⁰⁶ Given the unwieldy nature of AFHQ and limited available shipping, the move was piecemeal and gave host to a number of issues. Despite a total authorized number of officers and enlisted men of 1,646, the number of personnel active in the headquarters at the time was a little under half that number.¹⁰⁷ However, this discrepancy lies mostly in the number of British personnel, who occupied the First Army roster during this period (see appendix C). Additionally, the sheer distance between the United Kingdom and Algeria also posed serious command and control problems. In order to counteract these dilemmas, the Allies delegated duties within the various sections and sub-sections of the headquarters so that AFHQ could still function despite being scattered across the European and Mediterranean theaters of operations. One can see this in the decision to place contingents of the headquarters with the Eastern Task Force, the establishment of the advanced CP at Gibraltar, as well as the majority of the British contingent serving in First Army and much of the American G-4 section attached to the task forces. Space in Algiers was also a major factor to contend with, as AFHQ began to stake its claim in the city, and affected the time in which it took to set up a ground communications network after the invasion. The threat of enemy attack compounded the issues inherent in moving such quantities of men and material with limited shipping. Despite extensive efforts by the naval and air forces to protect the convoys from submarine and aerial

1942 after the Darlan assassination and does not cover any dealings with the French during the rest of the Tunisian campaign.

¹⁰⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 99, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹⁰⁷ The actual combined total of personnel working in the headquarters in November was significantly less, at only 783. The large discrepancy is due to the fact that much of the British component of AFHQ was fulfilling administrative functions in First Army.

attacks, some losses were sustained in November and December. Two ships carrying AFHQ personnel were torpedoed forcing one, the HMS *Strathallan*, to be abandoned near Oran. However, despite losing some personnel, these attacks were not significant enough to cause any major hindrance to the overall functioning of AFHQ.¹⁰⁸

Even though the headquarters was just beginning to trickle into North Africa, and despite a formal and acknowledged armistice with the French, the operational timeline held no room for delay. On November 10 General Anderson pressed east with First Army in order to secure Bizerte and Tunis to cut off Rommel's *Panzer Armee Afrika* before the Axis powers could establish a bridgehead in Tunisia. Indeed, Allied assumptions proved correct with Hitler committing to hold Tunisia, followed by an influx of available German forces, on the day Anderson began his advance. By early December Anderson's mixed-bag army of U.S., British, and eventually French forces were stopped just outside of Tunis, prompting Eisenhower to call for a temporary halt to consolidate and reinforce Allied positions. The advance was to begin anew at the end of the month; however, it was delayed until March of the next year. The Germans and Italians used the pause to consolidate and reinforce as well, and the onset of the wet North African winter stripped from the Allies any hopes of a continued advance. The continuous rain had transformed logistical shortfalls into a logistical nightmare; not to mention reducing the availability of air support to the front line.¹⁰⁹

Confounding an already tense situation was the incorporation of the French into the Allied camp. On November 13 the Allies decided that Giraud would take over command of all French forces in North Africa, with Juin remaining in his position as commander of French

¹⁰⁸ History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 26, 100-101, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹⁰⁹ Howard, *Grand Strategy*, "Vol. IV," 181; Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, 253; Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War*, 31-32.

ground forces.¹¹⁰ Although the question of Giraud's role in the whole affair (which would only become more complicated) had been partly solved, it did not mean that the French would become equals to the Americans and British in AFHQ. Instead, the French would become an "associated power" of sorts, working in conjunction with the American commanding general (Eisenhower). Their entire command and administrative organization would be kept intact and administered only by French personnel. Although technically this meant that the Anglo-American-French relationship was based on co-operation, under the Clark-Darlan agreement any French military, and all merchant vessel, movements had to be coordinated with U.S. forces. Thus, the United States held a considerable amount of control over French forces. In order to facilitate this relationship, Giraud established his headquarters in Algiers within close proximity to the Saint George Hotel.¹¹¹

The tensions surrounding French involvement did not abate with this arrangement, as the political situation of how to deal with French North Africa placed immense strain on the Anglo-American relationship. Some in the British camp began to see Eisenhower as focusing more on politics than on fighting the war, viewing Bedell Smith as the true voice of authority in AFHQ.¹¹² Speaking after the war, Lemnitzer commented on the situation in North Africa stating, "The problem was partly diplomatic, political, fiscal, economic [and not just military] ...No matter how you slice it, we went in on a shoestring."¹¹³ While Lemnitzer made the comment forty years removed, it seems that there was little appreciation of the intertwined nature of war and politics among some British officers. Indeed, as the combat operations at the front ground to

¹¹⁰ Clayton, *Three Marshals of France*, 72-73; Funk, *The Politics of TORCH*, 246-247.

¹¹¹ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. I, pgs. 104-105, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹¹² Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 33.

¹¹³ Carlo D'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002), 356-358; quote from SODP: Lyman L Lemnitzer, pg. 22, Lemnitzer Papers, USAHEC.

a halt, politics in Algiers raged on. The assassination of Admiral Darlan on Christmas Eve placed the civil authority of High Commissioner into the “inept hands of ...Giraud,” whose political inability was accompanied by a reluctance to engage in anything outside of strictly military affairs. Additionally, Eisenhower came under considerable attack on the home front with “people...yelling for his scalp in the United States.”¹¹⁴

The situation at the front was no better. At this time the Allied frontline looked generally as such: Anderson and First Army held the north flank; the French XIX Corps occupied the center under Juin; and the U.S. II Corps under Major General Lloyd Fredendall was in control of the southern flank. The issues came as French forces began to occupy a larger presence in Tunisia in late November, with Juin refusing to be subordinated to Anderson, or any British officer for that matter, whom Eisenhower originally intended to entrust as CG of all Allied forces in Tunisia. This refusal also placed more strain on the logistical system—a nightmare caused by a single line of supply to the front. As a temporary solution Eisenhower decided to establish a forward CP of AFHQ in the Algerian city of Constantine, where both First Army and XIX Corps headquarters were located at the time. The intent was to unify the front under a small detachment from AFHQ’s staff with Major General Lucian Truscott in charge of the CP when Eisenhower could not be present. The planning for the CP began with Truscott’s arrival in Constantine in the first week of January and the CP was officially operating by January 14. Since he was still directly in charge of combat operations, Eisenhower made frequent trips to the CP at Constantine until its closure on February 20.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.; Funk, *The Politics of TORCH*, 261, quote on Giraud from same; Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, 257-258. The quote by Lemnitzer actually reads “There were people who were yelling for his scalp in the United States, ‘He’s a collaborator.’”

The reality at the front ultimately solved the French dilemma. In order to maintain effective control of the battle space, Eisenhower placed all Allied forces under Anderson on January 27, again receiving resistance from Juin who came to terms with the agreement on February 3. Giraud, who was not present for the decision, endorsed it only after the fact. The resulting agreement effectively placed French troops under U.S. tactical command once Giraud and Eisenhower agreed upon strategy.¹¹⁵ Although this arrangement was a solution to the issue of command over French forces, this headquarters also appears to have been a temporary fix for Anglo-American disputes that arose out of combat performance in December.

In mid-December Anderson complained to the British Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, that the US forces used to augment his push on Tunisia were green, stubborn when offered advice, and their tactics were deplorable. Some American officers in turn blamed Anderson for their failings citing his micromanagement of their deployments on the front. They subsequently began calling for a national sector that would allow U.S. combat forces to function on their own, and like the French, not be under the control of the British. There was also immense suspicion of Clark by the British, who saw him as actively trying to “discredit the British in the eyes of the French” in order to take Anderson’s command in Tunisia. According to historian Matthew Jones, the “frustrations” of some American officers were not just directed at Anderson but also at Eisenhower for his “showing at AFHQ, in particular with his deference to the British.”¹¹⁶ While this seems reasonable in the context of the intense situation in which these

¹¹⁵ “C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,” pgs. 20, 29, RG 331, NARA 2; D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, 376; History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. I, pgs. 106-110, RG 498, NARA 2. Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, 383-384; Truscott, *Command Missions*, 125, 130-131. There are differing accounts as to who was responsible for the French refusal. The AFHQ official history claims it was Juin whereas the British official history implicates Giraud. The U.S. official history, on the other hand, has taken a more neutral position simply stating that “General Juin accepted the new situation and General Giraud made no objection. For the British account see Howard, *Grand Strategy*, “Vol. IV,” 183; the U.S. account see Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, 383.

¹¹⁶ Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 33-35, 247; quotes from 33 and 34.

men found themselves, Lemnitzer paints a slightly different story. He corroborates Jones's assertion (to which his only supporting documents are accounts from Clark) that American officers were indeed concerned, consistently, over Eisenhower's "leaning over on the British side." Yet his comment is that it was a move to avoid friction and not outright deference. Lemnitzer also claims that "The average American officer felt that we were a little more backwards...that Field Marshal Alexander [future Deputy C-in-C to Eisenhower and C-in-C British Middle East Forces] was really on the American side. Overly leaning over in order to avoid offending them." Additionally, he also stated that in his opinion the root of the issue was mostly due to personality clashes rather than to an unsurmountable barrier of Anglo-American differences.¹¹⁷

There were also tensions within the British camp as well that lean somewhat towards Lemnitzer's stance. On January 5 Gale, CAO of AFHQ, noted in his war diary that issues with the administrative staff of First Army were developing over jurisdictions of supply, which had been laid out four days prior. He wrote "Owing to the initial responsibility of the First Army [pushing immediately to Tunisia] it is very difficult to get them to realize that they dont [sic] control everything." Nearly a month and a half later his frustrations with First Army persisted and had grown more pointed. "There is no doubt about it that they cannot work to a normal system... They demand control of almost everything under the mistaken impression that we are not supporting them to the maximum extent." While these disputes were, in fact, "British-on-

¹¹⁷ SODP: Lyman L Lemnitzer, pgs. 36-37, Lemnitzer Papers, USAHEC. As my own research has shown Jones's assertion is correct; however, I find his citation of only material pertaining to Clark inadequate for such a generalization. One could counter and say that reliance on only Lemnitzer is no better, and to that I would agree. However, given that the British were not fond of Clark (for which Jones provides ample evidence), could it not also be possible that the ill-feelings towards Eisenhower were nothing more than Clark attempting to counteract the claims against him? Since the British thought he was trying to undermine their authority in order to gain his own, is it possible that he pointed to Eisenhower as being under British control in order to justify his takeover of command in Tunisia?

British,” Gale was a seemingly pragmatic man by nature and took his job seriously, despising any form of dysfunctionality within the administrative sections of AFHQ. On February 6, in what could be easily misconstrued as a slight against U.S. personnel, Gale informed his (British) subordinate brigadiers and colonels, who were working closely with the Americans, that it was imperative that they assist “the U.S. staff in every way possible without appearing to do so.” Yet, the comment came three days after a meeting with Bedell Smith on the dysfunctional nature of the American G-4, which indeed was in a state of utter chaos at the time.¹¹⁸ After the Casablanca conference, which ended on January 24, Marshall traveled to Algiers to get a first hand look at the problems facing Eisenhower. The American rear echelon so appalled him due to their “sorry state of disorganization [and] poor training” that he promptly relieved several senior officers of duty as a message.¹¹⁹

Undoubtedly the differences in command culture, military organization, and simple experience were root causes of much tension, yet it has also been shown that the individuals involved were just as much to blame. Indeed, some officers were relieved of duty due to their refusal to work with their counterparts. General Frank Ross, who worked with Brigadier Arthur de Rhe Phillipe in managing the General Staff section of Movements and Transportation, despised the British in general. The situation climaxed with Ross being relieved of command on January 26 and sent back to London.¹²⁰ A junior officer from the staff, Lieutenant Colonel

¹¹⁸ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. I, pg. 175, RG 498, NARA 2; The Papers of Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey Myddleton (1890-1971) Gale; “War Diary, January 1942,” Serials 98, 258; Box II/1-13; KCLMA. From here on cited as “Gale, “War Diary...,” KCLMA. The War Diary was organized in such a way that every new entry received a serial number, located in a column on the left-hand side of the page. Although the whole diary is split into separate folders by month, the serial numbers appeared to be continuous. For this reason, I decided to cite these as I feel it will provide a much faster method of finding the information for future researchers.

¹¹⁹ D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, 386.

¹²⁰ I was unable to determine if it was Eisenhower or Marshall who relieved Ross. Given that Ross was Eisenhower’s subordinate it seems entirely reasonable that he would have been the one to dismiss him. However,

Thomas Fuller, a reserve officer from Florida, replaced Ross until February 13 when Colonel George C. Stewart took over the staff section. Stewart seemed much more amicable in dealing with de Rhe Phillippe; in describing how he received his promotion, Stewart remarked that de Rhe Phillippe was one of the best officers the British army had. This, however, was not an indicator of good feelings across the board. Stewart and de Rhe Phillippe had a history that went back to just after the invasion, when Stewart was operations officer at the port of Oran. As Stewart recalls it they had a dispute over the efficiency of the port; de Rhe Phillippe apparently did not believe the reports on how much freight was being unloaded. Despite this background, when Stewart was assigned as Chief of Transportation and met with de Rhe Phillippe the incident seemed to be water under the bridge, yet telling of lingering tensions. When he approached de Rhe Phillippe his comment was “Rhe, I've been pulled up here to take over from Frank Ross. I don't know what it's all about and I sure don't know what I'm supposed to do,” to which de Rhe Phillippe responded “I'll tell you what you do. You come into my office. We'll have our desks in the same room, and we'll get along.” Stewart's ability to work with, and listen to, de Rhe Philip is an indicator as to why he remained in the position for the rest of 1943.¹²¹

Part 4 – Casablanca, the Battle of Kasserine Pass, and the Continued Growth of AFHQ

By the end of 1942 the Allied strategic disposition was such that two of the key assumptions made earlier that year were now voided. The specter of Russian collapse had disappeared with a successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad that surrounded the German Sixth

Marshall's tour of the rear areas, which he began two days before Ross's dismissal, points to the possibility that Marshall may have relieved Ross, not Eisenhower.

¹²¹ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 3, pg. 433, RG 498, NARA 2; “Trans. Oral History: George C. Stewart,” pgs. 8,10-12.

Army, an event that would prove catastrophic for the Germans. However, U.S. forces were now concentrated in North Africa and in the Southwest Pacific, with fierce fighting still taking place on a mostly secure Guadalcanal. Additionally, over the course of the year it was shown, although not universally accepted, that production capacity of the United States was incapable of meeting the demands of the Victory Program as quickly as envisioned, removing the prospect of a cross-channel invasion in 1943.¹²² In early November, before the landings in North Africa, the British Eighth Army launched their second assault at El Alamein. After initial success and then considerable setbacks, the offensive successfully put Rommel's *Panzer Armee Afrika* in retreat towards Tunisia. By January 1943 the Eighth Army was approaching the Allied forces in Tunisia.¹²³ Meanwhile German U-Boats continued to ravage Allied shipping and placed the crucial supply lines to the United Kingdom and Russia under immense pressure. Given the tumultuous nature of Allied strategic planning in 1942, Roosevelt and Churchill had realized the need for another major meeting between them and their military chiefs in order to generate a more concrete consensus. Thus, plans were made to gather at Casablanca in mid-January 1943 and an invitation sent to Stalin, who declined by citing ongoing operations in Russia but expressed (ignoring Allied forces battling German and Italian troops in North Africa) his expectation for the promised second front to open that year.¹²⁴

The schisms that had plagued U.S. military leaders in 1942, and their fraught relationship with Roosevelt, continued to persist as the meeting approached. The navy and General Douglas MacArthur, commander in the Southwest Pacific, continued to press for a focus in the Pacific.

¹²² Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 97. See James Lacey, *Keep from All Thoughtful Men* (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2011) for an in-depth analysis on how the production of the United States could not meet the demands for a 1943 cross-channel invasion.

¹²³ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. 110, RG 498, NARA 2; Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 204-205.

¹²⁴ Stoler, *Allies at War*, 86. In fact Stalin hated air travel, one of the main reasons he would not meet with Roosevelt and Churchill outside of the Soviet Union or Tehran.

Meanwhile a split had developed over whether or not the new Mediterranean theater and continuation of *Bolero* (the build-up of forces in Britain) were competing or complementary priorities. Indeed, Roosevelt seemed to believe the former whereas Marshall believed in the latter.¹²⁵ Churchill and his chiefs, however, went to Casablanca united under the premise that the Mediterranean theater should take priority. At Casablanca the terms of Anglo-American strategy in 1943 were largely set by the British and their Mediterranean focus, mainly because American industry could not fulfill the dictates of the Victory Program before spring 1944—a fact known to the JCS going into the conference.¹²⁶ The Americans in return demanded more attention be dedicated to the Pacific, to which a vague agreement was made so long as operations there did not interfere with the reaffirmed “Germany First” stance. Additionally, the American’s were forced to admit the inability of a large-scale cross-channel invasion into France in 1943, a prospect that did not sit well with Stalin despite the Allies’ claim that a forthcoming strategic bombing offensive—Operation Pointblank—constituted a “second front in the air.” Although the outcome of the Casablanca Conference was largely due to economic realities, there were also those in the American camp who saw logic in the British plan. Admiral Earnest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General H. H. Arnold, head of the U.S. Army Air Corps, saw a secure Mediterranean as a means to protect shipping and gain key airfields.¹²⁷

As the American chiefs grudgingly acquiesced to British plans, the question emerged of *where* in the Mediterranean the next operation should take place. Underneath the solid exterior of the British delegation were opposing views on the matter that existed before the conference began. The capture of Sardinia followed by Corsica in order to seize airfields seemed to be the

¹²⁵ Ibid., 45; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 97-98.

¹²⁶ Lacey, *Keep from All Thoughtful Men*, Chapters 9 and 10.

¹²⁷ Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 41-42; Stoler, *Allies at War*, 87.

prevailing prospect in the beginning. In fact, it was this approach that the planning staff of AFHQ insisted on. The alternative, an invasion of Sicily could not be mounted until August, leaving the Allied forces that were soon to amass in Tunisia sitting idle for an extended period of time. Despite the potentially long period of inactivity, the CCS ultimately decided on an invasion of Sicily. Admiral King even went as far as proposing a target date in July and would make the necessary adjustments in shipping to meet it. Thus, by the end of the conference the invasion of Sicily, code-named Operation Husky, was decided as the next major engagement of the Allied effort. Although the conference ended with a consensus strategy, the perceptions of many U.S. officers was that the British were taking the reins of Allied strategic planning, leaving the U.S. planners as spectators. This perception was compounded by the sweeping changes that occurred in AFHQ, specifically those dealing with the combat commands as a result of the incorporation of Eighth Army into the organizational structure.¹²⁸

Although the CP at Constantine had just been established a few days before the talks at Casablanca began, its replacement was a topic of discussion and indeed a crucial one. As previously covered, the CP was only designed as a temporary fix to the issues at the front. However, with the Eighth Army pushing Rommel into Tunisia throughout December and January (by January 23 the British had occupied Tripoli in Libya) the issue of command and control was once again brought to the forefront. With Eighth Army's imminent entry into Tunisia the CCS decided that in order to best coordinate the British, French, and U.S. forces, they should be united into an army group—titled the 18th Army Group—and to restructure the air and naval commands, consolidating them into unified commands underneath Eisenhower.¹²⁹ The

¹²⁸ Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 42-43.

¹²⁹ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. I, pgs. 116-131, RG 498, NARA 2. The consolidation of the naval command had been recognized prior to the invasion. The unified air command was born out of the experiences of November and

18th Army Group, in addition to taking over CP Constantine (including its office space), also took over numerous functions that until now were the responsibilities of AFHQ (see Appendix J). These included development and prosecution of tactical plans and operational directives in Tunisia; command of all Allied ground forces in Tunisia; and coordination with air and naval assets, now operating under separate commands, “through close liaison.” However, this did not translate into a headquarters that was “separate and distinct from AFHQ,” as Jones has called it (see Appendix I). Although all responsibility for the conduct of the fighting passed to the 18th Army Group, administrative and supply functions were still very much under the jurisdiction of not only AFHQ but also the higher headquarters of Eighth Army, GHQ MEF (General Headquarters, Middle East Forces). AFHQ still provided for First Army and XIX and II Corps, while GHQ MEF maintained Eighth Army in most administrative and supply details, with the army group responsible for coordination and control of supplies sustaining combat operations. Thus, the army group was clearly still a part of AFHQ, especially considering that the CG of 18th Army Group was the Deputy C-in-C to Eisenhower. On January 22 Eisenhower met with General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, who became C-in-C of British Middle East Forces on August 15, 1942, to discuss the details of 18th Army Group, with “provisional approval” being given the following day. It was decided that Alexander would become the Deputy C-in-C, AFHQ and take over 18th Army Group at Constantine. Arrangements for the transition began on January 24—Clark had been transferred to take command of the Fifth Army in Morocco on January 5, much to the relief of the British. However, the official announcement of Alexander’s posting did not come until February 18, the day he left for Constantine and after numerous urgings by Eisenhower to take command in the preceding weeks. The 18th Army Group remained

December, with the U.S. and British air forces operating independent of one another and subordinate to only Eisenhower.

operational, with Alexander commanding, until the cessation of hostilities in Tunisia on May 15.¹³⁰

The placement of Alexander as Deputy C-in-C was not the only command shift that worried U.S. officers. The restructuring of the naval and air commands also placed two more highly experienced British officers under Eisenhower. With Admiral Andrew Cunningham as C-in-C of all naval forces in the western Mediterranean and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as C-in-C of all air forces (including the British Middle East Air Command and RAF command at Malta), it appeared that U.S. authority in AFHQ was being undermined. Eisenhower himself feared that the principle of unity of command channeled through a single authority at the top was at risk and that the British would revert to the more familiar form of command by “committee.” He also recognized that back in the United States there was a need to keep public attention on the fact that the U.S. military was not being shoved to the side by the British in what was supposed to be a joint venture. In fact, Brooke relished in the fact that the British were able to wrest control of the actual fighting from underneath a commander whose lack of combat experience seemed a detriment.¹³¹ Indeed, it seemed that the core principle for AFHQ that Eisenhower established the previous year of filling the position with the most qualified person regardless of nationality was beginning to look like a loop hole for British dominance.

While the changes in the headquarters organization created new tensions, whether perceived or real, they were not the only changes that took place in AFHQ after the Casablanca

¹³⁰ Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 188; “C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,” pg. 26, RG 331, NARA 2; History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. I, pgs. 109, 111-113, RG 498, NARA 2; Hastings L. Ismay, *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 276. For a list of 18th Army’s functions see Appendix J. It can be seen again in these functions that 18th Army was very much a part of AFHQ.

¹³¹ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pgs. 116-124, RG 498, NARA 2; Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 46-47.

Conference. As the official history states “the year 1943 brought with it a more comprehensive definition of command relations and a more complete organizational and functional development of staff sections and other Headquarters agencies.” As the war progressed into 1944 and 1945 the changes made in 1943, many in the first half of the year, remained relatively unchanged. The lessons learned in all aspects of conducting integrated coalition warfare in the closing months of 1942 had been hard earned. Lemnitzer summed it up succinctly, speaking about the whole North African Campaign, calling it “a college education in itself.” The effects of these lessons led to sweeping changes in the whole of the headquarters, especially in the realm of administration and logistics, or what was referred to as the “Communication Zone.”¹³²

The changes made to the “Communication Zone” of AFHQ are simply too vast to describe in adequate detail here. Both the American and British systems evolved with the campaign, especially in regard to the British Line of Communications and its continuous jurisdiction disputes with First Army and cooperation with the American supply system. The issue of having only a single rail line to utilize also played a heavy role in these changes. Yet, out of these immense series of changes, one of the more significant in the “Communication Zone” was the creation of the North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA). The function of NATOUSA was the same as ETOUSA—the administration and supply of U.S. personnel—and interestingly had actually been foreseen as a necessity prior to the invasion. As covered earlier ETOUSA, based in the United Kingdom, was tied to the supply needs of Torch and remained so for the duration of 1942. The creation of NATOUSA removed this burden, and the unnecessary distance, of having to administer the U.S. supply line all the way in North

¹³² History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 1, pgs. iv, 167, RG 498, NARA 2, quotes from iv and “SODP: Lyman Lemnitzer,” pg. 22, Lemnitzer Papers, USAHEC.

Africa. However, it was not until January 14 that Eisenhower announced its necessity, as AFHQ had been acting as an intermediary theater headquarters given that Eisenhower still retained the title of CG, ETOUSA.

Although it was conceived as a necessity before Operation Torch even launched, the prospect of creating another U.S. theater headquarters was discussed among the JCS at Casablanca with the assumption, on January 14, that it would not activate until the end of the Tunisian Campaign. However, shortly after his arrival to the conference Marshall announced that he had begun preparations to split ETOUSA into two distinct theaters. On February 3, after Marshall returned to Washington, he cabled Eisenhower to inform him that he would no longer preside over ETOUSA and that he would now be in charge of the soon-to-be-established NATOUSA; the boundaries of which ran from the northwest of the Iberian Peninsula, along the Franco-Spanish border, stretching along the southeastern coast of France and tracing the northern border of Italy until the Austro-Yugoslavian juncture. It would also absorb all of French West Africa under its jurisdiction as well (see Appendix K).¹³³ The headquarters of NATOUSA was established in Algiers, alongside its parent command AFHQ (see Appendix L).¹³⁴

The creation of the new theater headquarters brought up unexpected questions as to Eisenhower's authority as C-in-C of all Allied forces, a title he retained despite no longer being the CG ETOUSA. However, the air was cleared surrounding this issue in a series of cables from the War Department, in which Marshall further clarified Eisenhower's position. As he did with ETOUSA, Eisenhower also designated a Deputy Theater Commander (DTC) to run the new theater headquarters. The issue of fleshing out the new headquarters with the proper staff

¹³³ The area in which NATOUSA was responsible did not remain in these boundaries and by 1944 it had incorporated much of the Balkans; see Appendix Z.

¹³⁴ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. 183-189, RG 498, NARA 2.

sections was temporarily solved by incorporating the necessary staffs of AFHQ with NATOUSA; in this capacity they served dual functions with both headquarters.¹³⁵ The officer that Eisenhower designated to be his new DTC was Major General Everett Hughes, who had already been serving as Gale's "deputy" despite having remained in the United Kingdom until February 3, the day he left for Algiers. When he departed the United Kingdom, Hughes had no idea as to why exactly he was being summoned to North Africa other than three days prior Bedell Smith had cabled him stating he had a "grand job" for Hughes. When Hughes arrived at Algiers later that night the only thing he received was confusion. "Bedell says that I am to be Deputy Theater Commander. What does that mean?" The next day Eisenhower told him the same thing. "Ike says I am to be Deputy Theater Commander. Still don't know what that means."¹³⁶ This is no failing on Hughes' part for not knowing what his new title entailed and rests in the fact that the U.S. Army simply did not have such a position in its established organizational doctrine.¹³⁷ It was not until February 9 that Hughes received detailed instructions from Eisenhower pertaining to his new position, and it was not until on February 15 that his position would be official. In essence, Hughes was now in charge of all logistical and administrative functions concerning U.S. forces that had previously been administered by AFHQ. Additionally, he was to establish and maintain close liaison with Gale and "in most respects [he became] the counterpart of the British CAO."¹³⁸

Gale confirmed this fact to his subordinates during a meeting on February 12, stating that "the position of Gen. Hughes on the U.S. administrative side was more or less parallel to his own

¹³⁵ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Secs. 1 and 2, pgs. 190-192, 224-225, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹³⁶ Hughes, "Personal," Folder: Diary Notes (1942-1956), ESHP.

¹³⁷ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. 192, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹³⁸ Dwight Eisenhower to Everett Hughes, "Instructions," 9 February 1943; Folder: General Correspondence, January – August 1943; Box I, Container V; and "Personal," Folder: Diary Notes (1942-1956), ESHP. Quote from History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. 193, RG 498, NARA 2.

position on the British administrative side.” However, Gale also made it known that he would continue to be the person coordinating U.S. and British administrative and logistical issues for combat operations.¹³⁹ While it appeared that Eisenhower’s principle of unity of command was under siege via the combat commands, Gale serves as an example of the British officers who committed themselves to making AFHQ function, despite the tensions. On January 5, Gale remarked, “Generally speaking this Headquarters is improving but is still far from the perfect running machine it could be. Merging the American and British Staff organization is rather like trying to screw a ‘metric nut’ on to a ‘Whitworth bolt’ – however we may get the threads sufficiently well crossed to ensure security.” This mentality of doing what is necessary to ensure victory is reflected in the relationship between Gale and Hughes, which appears to have been amicable with Gale willing to assist Hughes in setting up NATOUSA as much as possible. Shortly after Hughes’ arrival at Algiers he approached Gale “despondent about being able to produce a satisfactory system.” It seems that Gale attempted to instill some hope in Hughes by welcoming his arrival and telling Hughes that he personally thought there was a dire need for Hughes’ headquarters. He then proceeded to sketch out a potential setup for the headquarters for Hughes to consider. According to Gale, the thing that mattered most was that they work closely together on matters; from that he believed there would be few issues and a more efficient system would evolve.¹⁴⁰ Their working relationship is also a product of Hughes’ view of the British. While in London Hughes had grown rather fond of the British. Writing home to his wife Kate, just a few weeks before his departure to Algiers on December 20, Hughes gave considerable praise to the English men and women he had the pleasure of meeting, and stated that “It would

¹³⁹ Gale, “Notes on Chief Administrative Officer’s Conference, 12 February 1942,” War Diary, February 1943, KCLMA.

¹⁴⁰ Gale, “War Diary, February 1943,” Serial 222, and “War Diary, January 1943,” Serial 104, KCLMA.

be easy to become an Anglophile.”¹⁴¹ Yet, the reality of the situation in North Africa would create inevitable tensions between the CAO and the new DTC. Over the next few months Hughes consistently pressed Gale on matters of organizational setup and Gale became rather irritated with Hughes’ insistence on discussing the issue of bringing coal to North Africa.¹⁴²

In addition to the creation of NATOUSA, Gale’s own responsibilities expanded in the beginning of 1943 as well and would continue to do so as the Allies pushed into Italy later that year (see Appendix U). On January 1 he inherited the headquarters command that administered British Lines of Communication (supply lines) as well as the British portion of the AFHQ staff that had been serving with First Army since the invasion. As stated previously, despite NATOUSA now absorbing the U.S. administrative and supply responsibilities of AFHQ, the CAO was still responsible for coordinating the supplies going to the front. By May his range of responsibilities had grown so large that a secretariat was established in order to assist him in his daily activities.¹⁴³ The concerns of Hughes and the sense of Gale’s expanding responsibility can be seen in the changes that occurred in the G-4 and G-1 sections of AFHQ, with the creation of NATOUSA, and the addition of the First Army staff.

As previously discussed the American G-4 and G-1 sections were transferred to NATOUSA, becoming G-1 and G-4, NATOUSA, although they retained the responsibility of administering the U.S. forces of AFHQ. The dual nature of the U.S. General Staff sections (including G-2 and G-3) did not become resolved in any meaningful way until May 8, with the creation of NATOUSA’s own General Staff sections. From then on, the distinct U.S. General

¹⁴¹ Everett Hughes to Kate Hughes, December 20, 1942; Folder: Correspondence, December 1942; Box II, Container I; ESHP.

¹⁴² Gale, “War Diary, April 1943,” Serial 475, KCLMA; Hughes, “Organization,” Folder: Diary Notes (1942-1956), Box I, Container II, ESHP.

¹⁴³ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 3, pgs. 358-359, 361, RG 498, NARA 2.

Staff sections of the two headquarters coordinated efforts through liaison. The transfer of G-1 happened relatively seamlessly, with its formal re-designation occurring on February 15. The organizational layout of the section surprisingly did not change during the shift, and Sawbridge, recently promoted to brigadier general, remained as ACoS of the section for all of 1943 (see Appendices O and P). The transfer of G-4, however, resulted in a rather significant change in the sections priorities. The creation of Headquarters NATOUSA also entailed the creation of a theater Service of Supply (SOS, NATOUSA) that, in fact, took over many of the responsibilities of the G-4. A Chiefs of Staff conference at AFHQ on January 29 issued a directive that allowed G-4 to delegate its duties accordingly, leaving the section free to deal with matters of major importance, such as liaison with the British on the needs of combat operations (see Appendices V and W). Hamblen, now a brigadier general, continued to serve as ACoS of G-4 until March 20, when he was replaced by Colonel Clarence Adcock at the request of Hughes. Adcock himself only remained in the position until May 8.¹⁴⁴ The shifting of U.S. General Staff sections from AFHQ to NATOUSA also affected G-4, Movements and Transportation, but not until much later in the year. The nature of the section remained relatively the same since its creation the previous year; however, given that it had been elevated to a General Staff section, the U.S. Transportation section was removed from AFHQ entirely on May 8. Despite the transfer of the entire U.S. component of G-4 Movements and Transportation, it remained responsible for the combined transportation needs of AFHQ (see Appendices X and Y). Additionally, both de Rhe Phillippe and Stewart remained as the heads of their respective sections.¹⁴⁵ As the U.S. administrative and supply apparatus of AFHQ began to consolidate under NATOUSA, so too did the British

¹⁴⁴ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pgs. 260-261, and Pt. II, Sec. 3, pgs. 364-369, RG 498, NARA 2; Hughes, "Organization," Folder: Diary Notes (1942-1956), Box I, Container II, ESHP.

¹⁴⁵ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 3, pgs. 427-433, RG 498, NARA 2.

component begin to change. As previously mentioned, the British components of G-1 and G-4, AFHQ had been hollow and in fact were not formally activated until January 1. This seemingly significant change was because the respective “services” (the equivalent of the U.S. special staff sections) had been operating as a part of First Army. Thus, in 1943 all components of the British G-1 and G-4 were finally brought under the direct command of Brigadiers R. G. Lewis, who continued in his position of DQMG for the rest of the year, and V. J. E. Westropp, who retained his billet until December 12.¹⁴⁶

While a majority of the major changes within AFHQ occurred in the administrative General Staff sections, of which a very brief overview is given above, there were also shifts in G-3 (operations) and G-2 (intelligence). The degree of these changes is considerably smaller given that these sections were truly integrated and not paralleled like G-1 and G-4. Thus, the functions of G-3 stayed relatively the same during 1943, with most changes occurring in the form of modification or elaboration of pre-existing duties. The most significant change occurred with the creation of G-3, NATOUSA on May 8, which subsequently took control of all U.S. matters of defense and training in the Communications Zone (see Appendices S and T). As with the U.S. G-1 and G-4, after May 8 the two respective staffs still coordinated through liaison. Lemnitzer, however, never presided over these changes. In fact, he had been transferred back to his old command, the 34th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, on December 13 and replaced by Brigadier General Lowell W. Rooks, who remained ACoS, G-3 for all of 1943. Although Lemnitzer no longer officially served in the G-3 section, he remained on temporary duty at G-3, AFHQ, in order to assist with the planning of Operation Husky.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pgs. 255-256, and Pt. II, Sec. 3, pgs. 370-371, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹⁴⁷ AFHQ, SO 73, AFHQ Special Orders, RSS, RG 492, Box 1545, NARA 2; History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pg. 320-322, RG 498, NARA 2; SODP: Lyman L Lemnitzer, pg. 22, Lemnitzer Papers, USAHEC.

The changes made to G-2 in 1943 were similar in magnitude to those made in G-3. The duties of the section were augmented which led to the absorption of intelligence agencies that were not organic to the section and other relatively minor shifts in responsibility. Additionally, the transfer of the U.S. contingent of G-2 to NATOUSA followed the same pattern as the other General Staff sections, serving a dual purpose until May 8 (see Appendices Q and R). Although the general changes in G-2 were seemingly minor, some key changes were implemented as a result of the fighting in Tunisia. On February 1 the names of the sub-sections “Combat Intelligence” and “Security Intelligence” were changed to “Operational Intelligence” and “Counter-intelligence” respectively. This change was brought about due to confusion over the abbreviation for Combat Intelligence, CI, which was frequently misinterpreted as “Counter-intelligence.” One of the biggest changes to G-2 during this period was the removal of Mockler-Ferryman from the position of ACoS G-2 on March 25. He was succeeded by Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, who served as ACoS G-2 for the rest of 1943.¹⁴⁸ The reason why this may be seen as the biggest change in G-2, despite the obvious organizational shifts, is that Mockler-Ferryman’s removal, from not just G-2 but also AFHQ, was a direct result of events at the Tunisian front that transpired in the midst of AFHQ’s transformation.

On February 13 the bulk of Rommel’s retreating army entered Tunisia, and the following day he drove what remained of his forces through the Faïd Pass in the Eastern Dorsal of the Atlas Mountains; the southern flank of the Anglo-American-French defensive line. The area was controlled by overstretched and unprepared units, mainly the 1st Armored Division, belonging to Fredendall’s II Corps. The initial success of Rommel’s advance resulted in a crushing rout of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, which by February 16 had been pushed back roughly 25 miles. As the

¹⁴⁸ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pg. 296-, RG 498, NARA 2;

path directly to the AFHQ's Lines of Communication was being slashed open in the South, Anderson was reluctant to commit what reserves he had managed to muster since the discombobulated rush into Tunisia. He feared a potentially stronger German advance by the 5th Panzer Army under General Hans Jürgen von Arnim in the north against First Army. The piecemealed reinforcements Anderson did dispatch were sent to shore up the defenses securing the roads to Tebessa, Thala, and Sbiba. The subsequent battle at the Kasserine Pass is ultimately where Rommel's advance was halted, due to a combination of internal command disputes between Rommel and von Arnim, restrictive orders from Berlin, American artillery fire, and lack of supplies, above all fuel. However, the battle was not without the effect of registering a massive shock to the mostly inexperienced U.S. forces. The effects of Rommel's onslaught against U.S. forces in Tunisia, as historian Niall Barr puts it, "caused much soul searching."¹⁴⁹ Part of this "soul searching" inevitably led to heads rolling. On March 5 Fredendall was relieved of his command of II Corps and by March 11 he was on his way back to the United States. It was a move that Eisenhower had to handle with care as Marshall knew Fredendall, and, in fact, it was Marshall who had initially suggested Fredendall for the command the previous year.¹⁵⁰ Fredendall, a man who harbored an open disdain for the British, had a strained relationship with Anderson at best. More importantly, before Rommel's advance into the Faid Pass, Fredendall began creating an underground bunker for his command center in the walls of a ravine roughly sixty miles behind his front lines, while at the same time his forward lines were not adequately

¹⁴⁹ Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 227-230, quote from 229; Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 49-50; Playfair, Molony, Flynn, and Gleave, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Vol. IV, 289; Stoler, *Allies in War*, 118-119.

¹⁵⁰ Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed. *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 67.

prepared.¹⁵¹ It is of little wonder why Eisenhower sought to relieve him. Yet, he was not the only officer to be sacked in AFHQ.

As was previously stated, Mockler-Ferryman was officially replaced on March 25, however, Eisenhower had requested his replacement before Rommel's counter-attack had even ended. Indeed, the evidence pointing towards Mockler-Ferryman's removal based on performance is quite substantial. Disagreements between Rommel and von Arnim, and a genuine lack of men and material had dominated the perceptions of Allied intelligence circles leading to a belief that an Axis drive in the south was simply not possible. Rather the information that had been gathered seemed to point to an advance by von Arnim further north at Fondouk, the junction between French and British forces and an area of the Allied line deemed to be a weak point. Apparently Mockler-Ferryman believed that Rommel simply did not have the fuel nor the transportation needed to bring his forces into Tunisia.¹⁵² This assumption was not shared by Brigadier General Paul M. D. Robinett, commander of Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division. Robinett's group had been tasked to shore up the defenses at Fondouk; however, his reconnaissance had shown no signs of an Axis build-up in the area. Additionally, Anderson had placed his faith in the intelligence that had been gathered and the interpretations at both his headquarters and AFHQ, refusing to release Robinett to assist Combat Command A in the south when Rommel began his attack. According to historian Stephen E. Ambrose, the intelligence

¹⁵¹ D'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*, 356-358; Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 226.

¹⁵² It is interesting that there seems to be some discontinuity in the account of what Mockler-Ferryman reported (see sources cited below). The earliest, by Ambrose, states that Mockler-Ferryman believed that von Arnim intended to incorporate Rommel's forces and mentions nothing about Rommel not being able to move into Tunisia. Bennett and D'Este, however, are in agreement and it is their assessment that I have chosen to go with for the time being. Additionally, it is possible that D'Este simply regurgitated Bennett's own interpretation. Additionally, Matthew Jones work that focuses specifically on AFHQ does not even mention Mockler-Ferryman's dismissal and neither does the more recent work of Niall Barr. Both, however, mention the removal of Fredendall: see Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War*, 49-50 and Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 226-230.

failure was blamed on Mockler-Ferryman who had been “wedded to one type of information, had ignored too much evidence about the build-up [of Axis forces in the south] and had to go.”¹⁵³ The “one type of information” referred to was Ultra, the top-secret decrypts of German communications that gave the Allies an enormous advantage over their opponent for the last few years of the war. Unfortunately for Mockler-Ferryman, Rommel was also notorious for disobeying orders.

The over-reliance on one source of intelligence seems to be a common theme in the critique of the intelligence apparatus during the spring of 1943. Indeed, Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, the officer who replaced Mockler-Ferryman, agrees with this assessment in his memoirs. “Intelligence staffs too often based their judgements on one isolated piece of information, in which they had come to believe implicitly, and tended to disregard any contrary or alternative possibilities in the cherished theory. This is unfortunately true.” He also contends that Eisenhower largely blamed the intelligence failure for the setback as well and, interestingly, that this position was also held by Roosevelt, “who [had] asked why the attack had not been foreseen.”¹⁵⁴ In his own post-war account, *Crusade in Europe*, Eisenhower demonstrates this apparent focus of blame on Mockler-Ferryman by stating that the intelligence coming from U.S. troops in the south had been disregarded entirely. That “The belief that the main attack was... to come through Fondouk persisted, both at [First] Army headquarters and, as I later learned, in the G-2 Division at AFHQ. The G-2 error was serious. After the battle I replaced the head of my Intelligence organization...”¹⁵⁵ His line of reasoning is similar to that given in a cable to

¹⁵³ Bennett, *ULTRA and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945*, 202-203; D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, 391; Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Double Day, 1970), 168-170, quote from 173.

¹⁵⁴ Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (New York: Doubleday, 1969), 111-112, quotes from same.

¹⁵⁵ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 143, quote from same.

Marshall on February 21, the day before Rommel withdrew.¹⁵⁶ Among other things, Eisenhower informed Marshall of the intelligence shortcoming, stating that “Due to faulty G-2 estimates in this and lower headquarters, the First Army did not become convinced, until too late, that the attack through Faid Pass was really the main effort.”¹⁵⁷ Although the common narrative seems to place the blame on Mockler-Ferryman, there was an attempt to clear his name, however, it does not seem to have been deemed adequate by many, if any, historians.¹⁵⁸

One such historian is Ralph Bennett who takes the common narrative and expands on it, in a more or less hostile tone toward Mockler-Ferryman. Bennett’s aim seems to place the lion’s share, if not all, of the blame on the ACoS, G-2 starting with the invocation of a quote by Montgomery who called him a ““a pure theorist without practical experience.””¹⁵⁹ He continues by expounding on the established notion of over reliance on one source of information, but deflects any sort of blame that might befall Ultra:

As has been made clear already, [Mockler-Ferryman’s] mistake was not so much excessive reliance on Ultra as forgetting (or not possessing enough operational experience to realize) that although everything Ultra said was true, in the sense that there was no need to assess the reliability of each bit of information before using it, yet it had always to be borne in mind that higher authority might hold a different opinion from that of the author of a given decrypted message, that even the author himself might change his plans after issuing it (as Rommel had done), and—most important—that there were usually vital links in the chain of information that did not appear in Ultra at all.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Barr, *Eisenhower’s Armies*, 229.

¹⁵⁷ Dwight Eisenhower to George Marshall, February 21, 1943, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, Vol. II, eds. Alfred D. Chandler, Stephen E. Ambrose, Joseph P. Hobbs, Edwin Alan Thompson, Elizabeth F. Smith, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 970. From here on cited as “... in *DDE: The War Years*, Vol. ##, eds. Alfred D. Chandler, et al., pgs. ##.”

¹⁵⁸ Even more recent works such as Carlo D’Este’s *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life* the narrative is the same. D’Este blatantly states that Mockler-Ferryman “clearly bore a measure of responsibility.” D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, 395.

¹⁵⁹ Bennet, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy*, 208, quoted in text.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 208.

Bennett also challenges the attempt to exonerate Mockler-Ferryman. In his sixth appendix, he chastises the attempt by Stephen Ambrose to do this in an article he published in the *Journal of Contemporary History*. The information Ambrose presents states that Mockler-Ferryman was dismissed to even out the sacking of Fredendall in order to avoid any notion of national bias. Bennett points to the fact that Ambrose relied on information given to him based off of what the official British intelligence history was going to say, which was published the same year as Ambrose's article. Bennett also asserts that the official history, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, fails to exonerate Mockler-Ferryman in any substantial way. Returning to the claim made by Ambrose, Bennett points to the fact that in his book *Eisenhower*, published three years after the article, Ambrose performs an about-face and makes no mention of the information given to him on Mockler-Ferryman.¹⁶¹ The full text of Ambrose's "attempt" is located in the endnotes of his article "Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II" and reads as follows:

I am delighted to report that since submitting this article, Michael Foot has set me straight on this matter. He writes:

This is I am afraid a mistake. Just before Mockler-Ferryman died, I was sent down to see him with a message from Edward Thomas (Hinsley's deputy), that Hinsley's vol ii is going to clear Mockler-Ferryman entirely from the asperations that Eisenhower had to cast on him. Eisenhower sacked (hardly before time?) the American corps commander who had been surprised in the Kasserine Pass, felt that for reasons of Anglo-American amity he had to sack some senior British officer also, and sacked the Moke because he was one who could most easily at that moment be spared. Bletchley's files indicate that Mockler-Ferryman fully understood what the Germans were going to do and had made no secret of it to his commander. Eisenhower's message to Marshall was all part of the cover.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 376.

¹⁶² Stephen E. Ambrose, "Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1981): 165, quote from note 17. What is interesting is that Bennett also published a paper on Ultra in the exact same issue of the journal titled "Ultra and Some Command Decisions," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1981), 131-151.

The information given to Ambrose clearly indicates that the official British history would indeed clear Mockler-Ferryman's name. However, this whole topic would not be an issue if the official history definitively cleared Mockler-Ferryman's name, and so Bennett's critique is not entirely unwarranted. Through a combination of both the regular text and the 18th appendix, the official history paints a rather interesting picture of the Allied intelligence apparatus during Torch and the subsequent push to Tunisia, leading up to Kasserine. It describes a rather convoluted system for relaying Ultra intelligence from Bletchley Park to North Africa and that, despite being largely fixed by early December, "the critical period had passed, and the Axis powers had succeeded in reinforcing their bridgehead in Tunisia and consolidating their position there." This was exacerbated by poorly trained intelligence units that were sent to AFHQ and First Army in a piecemeal fashion, preventing any efficient means of decrypting intelligence in the field. It also states that the G-2 staff at AFHQ, that was to coordinate and direct the lower-level intelligence units, was just as equally inexperienced, and that the G-2, of First Army was not fully operational until January 1943 and was not tasked with intercepting Enigma communications for the first seven weeks of the campaign, during which everything had to be sent back to Bletchley Park.¹⁶³ However, the official history falls short of vindicating Mockler-Ferryman in that it provides no outright claim that he was sacked in order to make things fair within AFHQ, nor does it even mention him by name.

Interestingly, before his attack on Mockler-Ferryman, Bennett's book seems to reinforce the narrative of the official history making his claims seem a bit confusing and contradictory. He states:

¹⁶³ F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Vol. IV, *Its Influence on Operations and Strategy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 577-592, 739-746.

In marked contrast to the lavish intelligence Ultra provided in January, at just this time interception of the unprecedented variety of keys (the consequence of the multiplication of [Axis] operational commands) was incomplete, and decryption exceptionally difficult because of the new German security procedures. The result was scrappy and confusing intelligence which made interpretation unusually hazardous, particularly for the relatively inexperienced staffs in Algiers, so that in the end not only was no proper warning given of Rommel's and von Arnim's intentions, but disconnected items were fitted together in such a way as to prolong the plausible but erroneous belief that the main attack would be made at Fondouk rather than Faid or from the direction of Gafsa.

Yet, despite seemingly admitting that it was in fact a multitude of factors that led to the intelligence failure, Bennett quickly re-establishes the narrative of human failure, setting up his attack on Mockler-Ferryman. "It was Ultra's most notorious and regrettable failure, an object lesson in the drawing of overconfident conclusions from evidence too weak to support them, and a warning against relying too exclusively on a single source of intelligence. As with the British in 1941, human errors in judgment, rather than adequate intelligence material, were the reason for discomfiture on the field of battle."¹⁶⁴

What is left out from Bennett's analysis are two letters from Eisenhower to Brooke, the British CIGS, from the edited volume of Eisenhower's correspondence, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*;¹⁶⁵ something that Mockler-Ferryman was keen to place in his memoirs. On February 20 Eisenhower cabled Brooke directly requesting a replacement for Mockler-Ferryman. "I feel it essential to strengthen the Intelligence Section of this headquarters at the head of which I desire to retain a British officer." The officer in question, Eisenhower continues, should have "a

¹⁶⁴ Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy*, 203-204. The actual designation given in the history is the British "I (s)" which is the equivalent of the American G-2. For that reason, and reasons of continuity and clarity, I have used G-2.

¹⁶⁵ Concerning the information drawn from this extensive series, the papers were subject to a rigorous vetting process that removed any information that would "adversely affect national security [or] injure a living person." In the case of the latter many of the negative evaluations of subordinates given by Eisenhower were removed as many of the individuals in question were still alive at the time the series was being worked on. Alfred D. Chandler, et al., *DDE: The War Years*, Vol. I, xvii. A key point to note is that the edited volume was published in 1970, nineteen years before Bennett's book and eight years before Mockler-Ferryman's death.

broader insight into German mentality and method.” Placing the decision in the hands of Brooke he states, “If you concur I request that you make the change without prejudice to Mockler-Ferryman who has done some fine work which I fully appreciate.”¹⁶⁶ Almost a month later Eisenhower cabled Brooke again praising Mockler-Ferryman extensively. On March 14 Eisenhower informed Brooke that Strong had begun taking over G-2, but spends a majority of the letter speaking highly of Mockler-Ferryman and the job that he was able to accomplish. He states that “At the time he [Mockler-Ferryman] was faced with the very difficult task of organizing a completely integrated G-2 section with the British and American officers—none of the latter being known to him. Moreover, he was called upon at the very beginning to operate in addition to organizing and planning the Intelligence set-up.” He continues by claiming that “I feel that Mockler-Ferryman has had a very difficult and exacting task involving great responsibility,” and that during the planning phases of Torch “I doubt if we could have found a more capable man.” Eisenhower then affirms that he looks to Strong in order to fix the deficiencies in interpreting intelligence that had caused the debacle earlier in the month at Kasserine. Yet, whereas Eisenhower could have left it at that he continues to talk highly of Mockler-Ferryman. Referring to his comments on fixing the intelligence apparatus he asserts that “I do not, however, by this comment wish to convey the impression that Mockler-Ferryman has in any way failed and trust that my analysis of his qualities, given above, will make my estimate of his value clear and indicate my appreciation of his fine work. I sincerely hope that he will be given a command assignment commensurate with his ability and conveying a recognition of his services to both nations during the TORCH operation.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ Eisenhower to Alan Brooke, February 20, 1943, in *DDE: The War Years*, Vol. II, eds. Alfred D. Chandler, et al., 969-970.

¹⁶⁷ Eisenhower to Brooke, March 14, 1943, in *ibid.*, 1034-1035.

The letter from Eisenhower to Marshall that is mentioned in Ambrose's note exudes a notably different tone. Part of it has been mentioned above in discussing the intelligence estimates of AFHQ and First Army and the replacement of Mockler-Ferryman. Eisenhower continued, however, in explaining his rationale for replacing the ACoS G-2 stating that "in the broad aspect of the campaign, I realize that this affair is only an incident, but I am provoked that there was such reliance placed upon particular types of intelligence that the general instructions were considered inapplicable. In this connection and for your eyes only I have asked for the relief of my G-2. He is British and the head of that section must be a British officer because of the network of special signal establishments he operates..."¹⁶⁸ Indeed, Eisenhower seems to eschew injecting any emotion towards the matter at all, unlike in his cables to Brooke; although it seems likely that he was simply trying to appease the CIGS and was speaking frankly with Marshall.

Yet, there is another interesting factor about how Ambrose acquired his information that must be addressed—what he was told is corroborated by Mockler-Ferryman's memoirs and papers. In the finished copy of his memoirs Mockler-Ferryman states that upon reporting to the Military Secretary, Sir Colville Wemyss, he was told that the entire ordeal was "an unfortunate business" and that nothing would officially appear in his "personal papers" at the War Office. "[F]rom which," he continues, "I deduced, perhaps wrongly, that I had been made some sort of political scape-goat." He then describes the event above simply stating that he was contacted, years afterward, by a "man who had been concerned with the incident." The individual told him that "Washington had insisted on two scape-goats, one British, one American. The American was the U.S. Corps Commander." He then points out that his removal from North Africa did not

¹⁶⁸ Eisenhower to Marshall, February 21, in *ibid.*, 971.

preclude him being awarded the Companion of the Bath and the U.S. Legion of Merit, both highly prestigious awards.¹⁶⁹ The “man” Mockler-Ferryman refers to can reasonably be assumed to be Michael Foot, the individual who gave the information to Ambrose. In the papers of Mockler-Ferryman housed at the archives at Kings College, London, exists the original copy of a letter addressed to a Captain S. W. C. Pack of the Royal Navy and dated April 21, 1974. Pack had put an ad in *The Telegraph* the previous day requesting information on Operation Torch and the letter was a reply to this request. In it Mockler-Ferryman attached a draft copy of his memoir containing the passage described above.¹⁷⁰ Mockler-Ferryman died four years later in 1978.¹⁷¹

The cables from Eisenhower to Brooke and Eisenhower to Marshall discussed above paint a picture that may be looked as if Eisenhower was simply appealing to the British in order to prevent hard feelings. Indeed, the same could be said for the awards given to Mockler-Ferryman after his dismissal. However, the command that Mockler-Ferryman was given after he was relieved of duty generates another possibility. He was sent to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which “was an independent British secret service” established in July 1940 with the

¹⁶⁹ Private Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, “Memoirs,” pg. 86, IWM, for a list of his awards see “Appendix D,” 163. For a description of the Companion of the Bath award see “Guide to Honours,” BBC News, accessed March 2, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11990088>. For a description of the Legion of Merit see “Legion of Merit,” U.S. Navy, accessed March 2, 2018, [https://awards.navy.mil/awards/webapp01.nsf/\(vwAwardsDisp\)/AW-10052085MLFG?OpenDocument](https://awards.navy.mil/awards/webapp01.nsf/(vwAwardsDisp)/AW-10052085MLFG?OpenDocument).

¹⁷⁰ Mockler-Ferryman, Letter from Eric Mockler-Ferryman to Captain Pack, April 21, 1974, Folder: Miscellaneous, KCLMA; S. W. C. Pack, “Operation Torch,” *The Telegraph*, April 20, 1974, Issue: 36985, Section: Opinion and Editorial, pg. 16, accessed February 21, 2018, http://gdc.galegroup.com/gdc/artemis/NewspapersDetailsPage/NewspapersDetailsWindow?disableHighlighting=false&displayGroupName=DVI-Newspapers&docIndex=5&source=fullList&prodId=TGRH&mode=view&limiter=&display-query=TX+Pack+AND+PU+%22The+Daily+Telegraph%22+AND+IU+36985+AND+DA+119740420&contentModules=&action=e&sortBy=&windowstate=normal&currPage=1&dviSelectedPage=&scanId=&query=TX+Pack+AND+PU+%22The+Daily+Telegraph%22+AND+IU+36985+AND+DA+119740420&search_within_results=&p=TGRH&catId=&u=colu44332&displayGroups=DVI-Newspapers&documentId=GALE%7CIO0704720663&activityType=BrowseByDate&failOverType=&commentary

¹⁷¹ “Col. Eric Edward Mockler-Ferryman,” Jscic, accessed March 2, 2018, <https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/472a8323-2ebd-3852-9f9f-b6b0e15ec5f4>.

purpose of “conducting subversive warfare.” His command entailed the control of resistance forces in Western Europe, which itself was an integrated Anglo-American sub-section of SOE.¹⁷² The section of SOE that Mockler-Ferryman was given command of was created around the time that AFHQ was officially activated and was a merger of British and American secret service organizations. In September 1942 the British and American chiefs of staff agreed to combine the component of SOE in charge of northern Europe, known as the London Group, and the section of the American Office of Strategic Services responsible for northwest Europe into what became known as SOE/SO. The name subsequently changed in May 1944 to Special Force Headquarters, which SHAEF exercised operational control over. Mockler-Ferryman remained in command of this organization until 1945.¹⁷³ When compared to the outcome of Fredendall, who was given a training command in the United States, Mockler-Ferryman’s fate seems to lend some credibility to the idea that he was not sacked purely for incompetence.¹⁷⁴

While the above discussions do not equal definitive evidence, they are illuminating. The establishment of a timeline concerning the information given to both Mockler-Ferryman and Ambrose indicates that it came from the same individual, Michael Foot,¹⁷⁵ who was directly involved in the creation of the official British history on intelligence work during World War II. Additionally, the seeming contradiction of Bennett’s argument and the letters that he disregarded do not provide substantial evidence either; however, they make his claim suspect. Despite this, it is necessary to also compare the events surrounding the sacking of Fredendall and how they

¹⁷² M. R. D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), xx; Private Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, “Memoirs,” pg. 86, IWM.

¹⁷³ Foot, *SOE in France*, 20, 31-32, see pages 36-37 for organizational chart showing SOE/SO’s relationship to SHAEF; Private Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, “Memoirs,” pgs. 86-87, 162, IWM.

¹⁷⁴ Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* (New York: Random House, 2012), 263.

¹⁷⁵ Michael Foot is probably the author of the source cited above. In fact, the original publishers of *SOE in France* were Fayard, but more importantly, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; see Foot, *SOE in France*, xiii.

relate to that of Mockler-Ferryman. As previously covered, Fredendall was sacked on March 5 and sent home on the 11th. This is interesting considering that in Eisenhower's March 14 letter to Brooke he indicated that Mockler-Ferryman was still in North Africa helping Strong get adjusted. Additionally, according to historian Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower had demonstrated reluctance in relieving Fredendall in the first place. He asserts that as early as January, when the CP at Constantine was established, that "The most serious of Eisenhower's proliferating command problems in Tunisia remained Lloyd Fredendall."¹⁷⁶

In mid-January Truscott, Eisenhower's "second in command" at the CP in Constantine, warned Eisenhower of the state of Fredendall's headquarters. Truscott had visited the new II Corps headquarters shortly after it had relocated outside of the town of Tebessa and found that Fredendall had ordered the construction of underground bunkers for his headquarters in an isolated valley "a good sixty or seventy miles" from the front.¹⁷⁷ On January 30 Eisenhower cabled Marshall informing him that he planned on visiting the front in the next few days and that he was particularly interested in visiting Fredendall's area. His reasoning for this specificity was that he was "quite sure that in that sector we must keep up a bold and aggressive front...." Thus, it would appear that Eisenhower took Truscott's warning seriously but wanted to verify the situation for himself. However, on his trip to the front Eisenhower was able to visit Anderson's headquarters and was unable to reach Fredendall's position.¹⁷⁸ Although he was unable to assess the state of Fredendall's headquarters his doubts as to Fredendall's ability to "get along" with the British and French seemed to be assuaged during his visit with Anderson. On February 3 Eisenhower cabled Marshall stating that Anderson was satisfied with Fredendall and that he

¹⁷⁶ D'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*, 376

¹⁷⁷ Truscott, *Command Missions*, 132-133, 146; quote from 146.

¹⁷⁸ Eisenhower to Marshall, January 30, 1943, in *DDE: The War Years*, Vol. II, eds. Alfred D. Chandler, et al., 932.

himself no longer harbored any doubts about Fredendall. In fact, the following day Eisenhower even recommended to Marshall that Fredendall be promoted.¹⁷⁹ The same day, however, Eisenhower also sent an unofficial message to Fredendall that seems to belie Eisenhower's proclaimed satisfaction with the commander.

In his February 4 cable to Fredendall, which was sent unofficially so that it would completely bypass Anderson, Eisenhower stated that he no longer had any more concerns as to Fredendall's open disdain towards the British. This would appear to be in-line with what Eisenhower told Marshall, however, Eisenhower included a rather interesting and subtle message in closing the topic. After stating that he has no doubts as to Fredendall's "loyalty and determination" he continues by impressing on Fredendall that "our Allies have got to be partners and not people that we view with suspicion and doubt." This raises the question as to whether or not Eisenhower's doubts about Fredendall had actually disappeared. Indeed, Eisenhower continues in the cable to address other issues raised by Truscott's visit to the II Corps headquarters:

One of the things that gives me the most concern is the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts...Ability to move rapidly is largely dependent upon an intimate knowledge of the ground and conditions along the front. As you well know, this can be gained only through personal reconnaissance and impressions. Generals are expendable just as any other item in the Army; and, moreover, the importance of having the general constantly present in his command post is frequently overemphasized.¹⁸⁰

This approach stands in stark contrast to Eisenhower's remarks to Major General Thomas T. Handy, a long-time friend and the officer who replaced him at the OPD, in a January 28 cable. Although the main purpose of the cable was to smooth over any harsh-

¹⁷⁹ Eisenhower to Marshall, February 4, 1943, in *ibid.*, 937-938; for information on the February 3 cable see note 5 on page 938.

¹⁸⁰ Eisenhower to Lloyd Ralston Fredendall, February 4, 1943, in *ibid.*, 939-940, quotes from 940.

feelings with the OPD over the results of the Casablanca Conference, Eisenhower firmly declared his dedication to the principles of unity of command and effort. “I constantly watch for any flare-ups that might endanger the work so far done and I think that everyone knows, both British and American, I would ruthlessly eliminate any man who violates my instructions and my convictions on this point.”¹⁸¹ Indeed, General Frank Ross had been relieved of command only two days before on January 26; however, Ross’s dismissal may not have been by Eisenhower. After the Casablanca Conference ended on January 24, Marshall toured the American rear-areas of AFHQ in order to assess the difficulties in which Eisenhower was facing. He was so appalled by its dysfunctional state that he promptly relieved several senior officers of duty as a message.¹⁸² Thus, it seems reasonable that Ross may have been relieved by Marshall and not by Eisenhower which, if true, would fall in line with comments made by historians on Eisenhower’s reluctance to relieve Fredendall.

Ambrose notes that Eisenhower had no precedence in relieving officers and this, in conjunction with the fact that Marshall hand-picked Fredendall, led him to not relieve him right away.¹⁸³ This latter point is also made by historian Joseph Patrick Hobbs who states that “Because Fredendall was a Marshall selection, Eisenhower moved carefully,” and is corroborated by D’Este who claims that during this period Eisenhower’s “debt to Marshall was so huge that he was unable or unwilling to carve out his own independence.”¹⁸⁴ Ambrose also points out that “Later in the war, when more was at stake and he had more confidence in himself,

¹⁸¹ D’Este, 374, 392. Quote from Eisenhower to Thomas Troy Handy, January 28, 1943, *DDE*, 928.

¹⁸² D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, 386; “Trans. Oral History: George C. Stewart,” pgs. 8,10-12.

¹⁸³ Ambrose, *Supreme Commander*, 172-173.

¹⁸⁴ D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, 384; Hobbs, *Dear General*, 67.

[Eisenhower] would relieve commanders at the first sign of uncertainty in battle, and Fredendall had already shown many signs of uncertainty.”¹⁸⁵

This latter point is significant. If Eisenhower was truly reluctant to relieve Fredendall because he was the personal pick of his mentor; that he had no precedence in relieving officers under him (especially senior officers in charge of combat units); and that given his history with Marshall, Eisenhower felt compelled not to cross him, there seems to be good reason to suggest that his motivations for relieving Mockler-Ferryman were not solely based on failures in interpreting intelligence. In this light it is possible that Eisenhower capitalized on the situation in order to establish a precedent in relieving senior officers; that in order to gain “credibility” in the eyes of Marshall, which he may have deemed necessary before sacking Fredendall, he had to relieve another senior officer as well. It is possible then, considering everything presented thus far, that Mockler-Ferryman was indeed a sacrificial lamb. The notion that Washington was pulling the strings raises yet another possibility. Roosevelt had already demonstrated his willingness to make final calls on military matters, both operationally and tactically. This shows that, at the least, he was not afraid to dip below the level of strategic concerns. Admittedly, this does not definitively show that he was also comfortable in recommending that officers be relieved in a lower headquarters. However, Strong’s comment on Roosevelt inquiring into why the debacle at Kasserine happened in the first place brings the specter of domestic political reality (so often ignored in military history) back into the limelight.

Indeed, Roosevelt’s decision to invade North Africa was motivated by domestic politics, originally hoping to have U.S. forces fighting Germans before the mid-term elections, but also a

¹⁸⁵ Ambrose, *Supreme Commander*, 173.

desire to keep North Africa out of Axis hands.¹⁸⁶ More importantly, the Darlan deal had created a heated public outcry in the United States with both Eisenhower and the president becoming targets of the outrage. D'Este points out that one of the options available to Roosevelt would have been to sack Eisenhower, "an act for which there was ample precedent in American history." Instead, Roosevelt opted to defend the decisions of his commander.¹⁸⁷ Having already defended Eisenhower during a politically distasteful event, it seems entirely reasonable that Roosevelt would demand answers from the C-in-C as to why the U.S. suffered such a humiliating defeat. Fortunately, the public was not made fully aware of the details of the battle, especially the number of casualties inflicted on U.S. forces, providing some political buffer.¹⁸⁸ Thus, with the details of the tactical and intelligence failures kept close at hand, the demand for equal punishment could have been motivated by a desire to reinforce, in the public perception, the unity of the Anglo-American alliance. It could have also served as a way to dampen the internal tensions that arose surrounding poor performance of U.S. forces and reinforce the principle of unity within the alliance. By relieving both a British and American senior officer it would not appear as if only the U.S. forces were to blame, but that the British and Americans had fought, and failed, together. Indeed, even if the reality of the intelligence issues leading up to Rommel's counter-attack were fully known to both governments, translating that to a national audience would simply have been impossible.

In light of all this, some questions still remain regarding the fates of Mockler-Ferryman and Fredendall. In regard to Mockler-Ferryman, one must ask why a command encased in secrecy was given to someone who has supposedly shown themselves to be incompetent in their ability

¹⁸⁶ Meredith Hindley, *Destination Casablanca: Exile, Espionage, and the Battle for North Africa in World War II* (New York: Public Affairs, 2017), 77-80.

¹⁸⁷ D'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*, 356-357, quote from 357.

¹⁸⁸ Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace*, 266.

to perform? The same could be said for Fredendall as well. Why was he promoted and allowed to preside over the training of U.S. troops if he was held largely responsible for the failures at the Battle of Kasserine Pass? Additionally, was his promotion also a means of assuaging any hard feelings for his failures, similar to the awards given to Mockler-Ferryman?

The final conclusion on this matter is that more research and evidence is required in order to truly address the issues surrounding Mockler-Ferryman. At a minimum, the evidence provided thus far has hopefully demonstrated that the situation is much more complex than simply one man being at fault for the failings of an entire agency within a large command structure. This would seemingly have little effect on AFHQ as an organization, as it was still able to function effectively after the incident. On the other hand, it raises questions as to how far the British and Americans were willing to go in order to ensure that the perception of Allied unity was maintained. Here the implications for the officers at AFHQ, and all integrated Anglo-American commands for that matter, could have been substantial. By removing one senior officer from each nationality for the failures of many, it would establish the precedent that there will always be parity in dismissals; that above everything else, the perception of a united and unshakeable Anglo-American alliance was to be maintained. On a much smaller, but still potent, scale, the dismissal of one senior officer from each nationality would serve as a message to the entire headquarters. Simply put, the principle of “unity of command and effort” was the life-blood of AFHQ and of the Allied war effort. Without it the Allies would lose and so when serious failures were encountered both nations would bear responsibility. Many historians point to the fact that Eisenhower relieved numerous American officers for refusing to work with the British, but hardly anything seems to be mentioned about him relieving British officers. Claims of

appeasement aside, could the firing of both Fredendall and Mockler-Ferryman have also served as a way to demonstrate that no one was safe in violating Eisenhower's coveted principles?

Whatever the final conclusion on the matter may be, the war continued after Mockler-Ferryman was let go. Indeed, the fighting in Tunisia continued to rage until May 13, the day von Arnim surrendered and five days after the last Axis strongholds were breached by Allied forces. On May 7 a revitalized U.S. II Corps, led by Major General Omar Bradley, entered Bizerte accompanied by a successful assault on Tunis by First Army occurring on the same day.¹⁸⁹ In the background of the fighting that led to the expulsion of the Axis powers from North Africa, AFHQ continued to grow. In fact, its enlargement served as a focal point of criticism from both the British and the Americans.¹⁹⁰

Indeed, Eisenhower had been concerned with the growth of his headquarters as early as December, and tasked Truscott to conduct a study on how best to keep it at manageable size. Truscott, who had been waiting for orders to what would become the CP at Constantine, duly went about figuring out how to give Eisenhower recommendations.¹⁹¹ On December 30 Truscott submitted his harsh appraisal and his personal recommendations for trimming the size of AFHQ. According to the report, Truscott seemed to be quite concerned with a large amount of work being duplicated among the various staffs. He also recommended removing anyone from the headquarters whose primary role was not a staff function. However, in his final paragraph he acknowledged the fact that he had little understanding of organizational structures and was unable to conduct an extensive analysis of the various staffs. Yet, his closing remarks are telling of a general sentiment that existed at the time: "Mine is the point of view of the field commander

¹⁸⁹ Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies*, 241; Jones, *Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War*, 52-53.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁹¹ Truscott, *Command Missions*, 125.

who comes to this Headquarters, is at once appalled by its size, and wonders how it can ever function efficiently...several officers have expressed similar sentiments.”¹⁹² Reflecting his findings in 1942, Truscott contends in his post-war accounts, *Command Missions*, that “The Allied nature of the headquarters was one of the principal reasons for [its] ponderous size...”¹⁹³ Indeed, the issue of size continued to bother Eisenhower into 1943 (see Appendix M). In a cable to Marshall on February 8 Eisenhower bluntly stated, “I am sure my staff thinks I am getting tougher and more arbitrary day by day but, although I admit the impossibility of working without adequate staffs, they do seem to develop diseases that include obesity and elephantiasis. Apparently only a sharp knife, freely wielded, provides any cure.”¹⁹⁴

Throughout 1943 AFHQ made substantial increases “in range and complexity of functions” that led to what the official history mildly calls “an appreciable increase in personnel.” From November of 1942 to the end of 1943 AFHQ, despite Eisenhower’s desires to “trim the fat,” had grown to over twice its size—from 1,646 authorized personnel to 4,072. Even the number of personnel in November 1942 had not been anticipated. The September requests for U.S. personnel gave the optimistic estimate of only needing a combined total of 998 officers and enlisted soldiers. Before AFHQ had been moved completely to Algiers the U.S. compliment already numbered 1,308 officers and soldiers. Despite attempts made by both nations to reduce the ever-increasing size of their personnel commitment to AFHQ, it continued to balloon during the year. The British appeared to have fared better in this, with a relatively small increase of only 486 total personnel. The U.S. contingent increased significantly in comparison. The advent of NATOUSA and SOS, NATOUSA, instigated a dramatic increase of 1,078 personnel by October.

¹⁹² “Reduction in size of AFHQ,” Memorandum to the Chief of Staff from Major General L. K. Truscott, 30 December 1942; AFHQ Microfilm, FN: AG 323.35-1; RG 331; NARA 2.

¹⁹³ Truscott, *Command Missions*, 129.

¹⁹⁴ Eisenhower to Marshall, February 8, 1943, Algiers, in *Dear General*, ed. Hobbs, 101.

Yet, and most surprisingly, by the end of 1943 the ratio of authorized British-to-U.S. personnel in AFHQ was nearly 1-to-1. Out of the 4,072 staff-related members of AFHQ, 2,012 were American and 2,060 were British (see Appendix N). Indeed, it would seem that although the principle of “unity of command and effort” created turmoil, the principle of “balanced personnel” was willingly adhered to.¹⁹⁵

Conclusion

The trials and tribulations of unified and integrated command did not end in the summer of 1943. The evolution of AFHQ, and the Anglo-American relationship that centered on it, continued to evolve during the invasions of Sicily (mid-July) and Southern Italy (early-September), and with the merger of the British Middle East command, GHQ MEF, in December.¹⁹⁶ As the war progressed the number of nationalities that were incorporated into AFHQ also expanded and between December 1943 and June 1944 AFHQ had grown to incorporate “contingents of Poles, Greeks, Brazilians, Jugoslavs [*sic*], and Belgians.”¹⁹⁷ In January 1944, as the time drew near for a cross-channel invasion, Eisenhower was replaced as C-in-C, AFHQ by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. Later that month Eisenhower established SHAEF in the United Kingdom.¹⁹⁸

The lessons that Eisenhower learned in operating an integrated multi-national command structure during the campaigns of North Africa and Italy provided the foundation of his command at SHAEF. However, issues continued to linger within the Anglo-American alliance

¹⁹⁵ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 2, pg. 240-246, RG 498, NARA 2, quotes from 240.

¹⁹⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. II, Sec. 1, pgs. 139, 142, and Pt. III, Sec. 1, pg. 619, RG 498, NARA 2.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 619.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 619-627.

concerning continued operations in the Mediterranean and command of ground and air forces. Eisenhower also bore the weight of pressure from the highest political and military echelons of both the United Kingdom and the United States.¹⁹⁹ As a result, one of, if not the most, crucial concept that Eisenhower carried over from AFHQ to SHAEF was the principle of “unity of command and effort.”²⁰⁰ His stalwart defense of this principle proved invaluable in navigating these disputes.²⁰¹ However, Eisenhower was only one man and in order to ensure that the principle of unity of command was adhered to within SHAEF he brought over numerous officers that had served with him at AFHQ; relying heavily on the trust established with his American and British subordinates in the grueling campaigns of 1942 and 1943. This trust was derived from the established premise that Eisenhower’s loyalty lay with the principle of unity of command and effort towards a unified victory.²⁰²

Thus, the tumultuous period from AFHQ’s inception in August 1942 to the end of the North African campaign can be seen as only one part in the larger narrative of integrated command during World War II. Yet, it was a critical period in which the concepts of integrated command and unity of effort were tested in a command organization cobbled together in an astonishingly short period of time under conditions of extreme duress and uncertainty. As historian David Jablonsky notes:

¹⁹⁹ Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 106.

²⁰⁰ Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 41-42.

²⁰¹ Jablonsky, 113-117; Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 43-45. Of those, the issue of authority and implementation of the Allied air forces slated to be utilized in the cross-channel invasion seems to have been a salient issue that had persisted since Operation Torch.

²⁰² Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 106-107. The officers that were carried over from AFHQ included the Deputy Supreme Commander, CoS, CAO, the ACoS of G-2, the DACoS of G-3 as well as the “deputy chief of civil affairs, chief of press relations, chief of the psychological warfare division, and adjutant general.” The British CSC also drew heavily from their ranks in the Mediterranean that had experience in working with Eisenhower. These include “the chiefs of staff of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force...commander of British land forces and his chief air commander; and the British army commander for the invasion.” See Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 56-58.

In actuality, AFHQ was an ad hoc affair that established as a consequence an important, flexible organizational trend for the future. Throughout the rest of the war, the structure and personnel of the Allied organization would remain fluid depending on the demands of overall coalition strategy. But the essential foundation remained the principles of unity of command and unity of effort.²⁰³

Simply put, the impact of AFHQ during World War II cannot be understated.²⁰⁴

The intent of this thesis has been two-fold. On the one hand it attempts to rectify what seems to be a rather astonishing dearth of literature on the genesis of a truly integrated multinational command organization. It struck me as odd that a period of history so extensively analyzed such as World War II would have so little on a concept that played such a monumental role in the war. This is not to say that no attempts have been made to address this issue, as my own research would not have been possible without the previous work of others. Herein lies the second aspect of my paper. I have attempted to build upon the foundations laid out by others in order to give more depth to not only the organization that embodied the concept of integrated and unified command, but also cast a light on the lesser-known officers who put it into practice. The latter aspect is a difficult task for any researcher as they are beholden to the information available. By focusing on a specific cadre of officers in AFHQ who demonstrated the principles on which the command was founded, the load of this task was significantly lightened. It also brought to light a more nuanced perspective on how these principles may have interacted with and were subject to the political realities of the war.

²⁰³ Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air*, 70.

²⁰⁴ The principle of “unity of command and effort” was not the only experience that benefited Eisenhower while in command of SHAEF. According to the official history other critical factors were dealing with the difficult political question that the French posed; the establishment and functioning of civil affairs and military governments; and the handling of public relations and psychological warfare, all of which resurfaced in the European Theater of Operations. While it is impossible to say that any of these were of little value, the principle of unity of command was the foundational glue that held both AFHQ and SHAEF together. One need only look at the Axis powers or the Triple Entente during World War I to see how a disjointed command may have played out.

Admittedly, my own work has been restricted in this endeavor as it covers less than a year of AFHQ operations, with still yet another year and a half left in the war and the creation of another integrated command structure that oversaw the cross-channel invasion and advance across France and the Low Countries, and into Nazi Germany. Even then, more could be done in a cross-comparison of coalition warfare between the Allied and Axis powers. Such an analysis would be obligated to consider the political events and motivations that acted in tandem, or conflicted, with the prosecution of the war by the militaries involved.²⁰⁵ As a result, a more comprehensive picture of not just World War II, but war more generally, could be realized; that political considerations, within the command, in the theater in which the command is operating, and on the home-front all play integral parts in how the command functions. Thus, it would appear that the Allied invasion of North Africa, and the Mediterranean theater more broadly, holds more historical riches and lessons learned than historians have been willing to accredit it.

²⁰⁵ For one such work, see Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds., *Grand Strategy and Military Alliances* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Note on Appendices

The following appendices serve as a visual guide to the text so that the reader can better understand the structural complexity of AFHQ. In regard to the personnel charts I have included the original footnotes as they appeared in the official history as they explain where these numbers come from. It is important to read these in order to understand the limitations of the charts. The historians who worked on these histories encountered difficulties in obtaining accurate numbers for all significant periods as “Such information was considered so voluminous and varied that many of the records were destroyed by the sections after their... usefulness [had] passed.” To avoid misuse of incomplete data only the numbers of “authorized personnel,” with the only exception being the chart for 1942 (the only complete roster found).²⁰⁶ Additionally, the dates for many of the charts in general, especially for the period of 1943, do not exactly match the periods in which they are referred to in the text. However, given the practice of destroying documents once they were no longer of use these charts may very well be the closest we can get to any specific period of AFHQ’s existence. Regardless, these charts capture the essence of AFHQ’s organizational structure and complexity of functions, making them invaluable to understanding the headquarters. Thus, I urge the reader to take these limitations into consideration when combining the information from the charts and text in order to furnish a more complete understanding of AFHQ.

Citations for Appendices:

The charts have all been drawn from the digital copies of the official history; however, I have chosen to cite the page number of the physical copy and not the PDF. This was done as it

²⁰⁶ History of AFHQ, Pt. 1, pg. vii, RG 498, NARA 2.

allows future researchers to reference these pages regardless if they consult digital or physical copies of the histories. The digital copies can be downloaded from the Defense Technical Information Center website.²⁰⁷ For ease of reading the format I have chosen for the citations is as follows: “[the appendix referenced] – [the page number(s) where the chart can be found in the corresponding part/section].”

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²⁰⁷ United States Department of Defense, Defense Technical Information Center, https://publicaccess.dtic.mil/psm/api/service/search/search?q=&num=10&site=default_collection&as_epq=History+of+Allied+Force+Headquarters&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_occt=any&btnG=Search.

²⁰⁸ This is a word document created by me but copied directly from the official history text.

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
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ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHART, AFHQ
26 August 1942



1. (Writer's note: The functions indicated on the chart have been omitted. Statements 2-4 below are quotations from the original chart.)


2. "All of the functions listed for the General and Special Staff sections will not necessarily be performed at this time."

3. "Under the Special Staff Section blocks are shown the General Staff Sections primarily concerned..."

4. "Prepared by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. Approved by command of Lt Gen Eisenhower." Signed by Col T. J. Davis, AG AFHQ.

* These designations had already been changed to Allied C-in-C and Deputy Allied C-in-C.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, AFHQ
1 November 1942



LEGEND:
----- Line of General Supervision
----- Line of Command

NOTE: The letters in the lower right of each box indicate the nationality of the chief officer and not that of the personnel as a whole.

Appendix C

TABLE OF AFHQ PERSONNEL
November 1942

Ranks	Am* Auth	Br# Auth	Am* Actual	Br ^x Actual	Combined Auth	Combined Actual
Lt Gen	1		2	1	1	3
Maj Gen	1	1			2	
Brig Gen	2	15	5	8	17	13
Col	48	21	45	7	69	52
Lt Col	41	48	42	18	89	60
Maj	48	98	62	31	146	93
Capt	53	85	54	22	138	76
1st Lt	21	20	42	3	41	45
2d Lt	2	2	61		4	61
Total Officers	217	290	313	90	507	403
<hr/>						
CWO	4	23		7	27	7
WOJG	13	31	11	8	44	19
Total WO's	17	54	11	15	71	26
<hr/>						
M/Sgt	29		13		29	13
T/Sgt	31		18		31	18
S/Sgt	25	23	16	5	48	21
Tec 3	43		36		43	36
Sgt	17	89	14	14	106	28
Tec 4	62		39		62	39
Cpl	2	88	8	24	90	32
Tec 5	50		37		50	37
Pfc	86	71	76	21	157	97
Pvt		452		33	452	33
Total EM	345	723	257	97	1068	354
<hr/>						
Combined Totals of Personnel	579	1067	581	202	1646	783


* Statistics taken from a Table of American Personnel in AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, contained in envelope at end of file.

Statistics taken from British War Establishment, "R" Hq (VIII/374/1), 12 Oct 42.

x Statistics for British officers taken from two different rosters: that of 19 Oct 42 or 1 Nov 42, whichever was more complete, since some sections had more complete rosters as of 19 Oct than in their lists of 1 Nov. Roster of AFHQ Officers, c. 19 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8). Statistics for British warrant officers and other ranks who were actually on duty at AFHQ were obtained from statements by individuals who were with the various sections in Nov 42.

NOTE: The reason for the large discrepancy between the British authorized and actual personnel is found in the fact that some of the British AFHQ personnel served as an increment to 1st Army (B) in the invasion period.


ORGANIZATION OF G-1 SECTION AFHQ
c 1 November 1942



AMERICAN


BRITISH

ORGANIZATION OF G-2 SECTION AFHQ
August-September 1942



NOTE: The letter opposite the name of a subsection or branch indicates the nationality of the head of the unit and not the nationality of all the personnel.


ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-3 SECTION AFHQ
21 December 1942



NOTE: The letter at the bottom of each box indicates the nationality of the chief and not of all the personnel.

* G-3 Training had not been subdivided before the move to ALGIERS.

ORGANIZATION OF G-4 SECTION AFHQ
December 1942




AMERICAN


BRITISH

LEGEND:
----- Command
----- Co-ordination

ORGANIZATION OF MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION SECTION AFHQ
October 1942



18TH ARMY GROUP COMMAND RELATIONS WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS
February 1943



LEGEND:
—— Command
----- Liaison and co-ordination
-.-.-.- Supply and maintenance

NOTE: Small initials in boxes indicate nationality of the commander; capital initials indicate nationality of the whole headquarters or unit.

List of functions delegated by AFHQ to 18th Army Group (as listed in the official history):

- a. To develop tactical plans and issue directives for operations in the Tunisian area.
- b. To command all the Allied ground forces in the Tunisian area.
- c. To co-ordinate Army operations with Air and Navy through close liaison.
- d. To regroup the Allied forces then fighting in the Tunisian area.
- e. To form and train a general reserve.
- f. To co-ordinate all intelligence activities of 1st and 8th Armies to the following extent:
 - (1) Intelligence was not to be collated at 18th Army Group.
 - (2) The Group Headquarters disseminated AFHQ intelligence to Armies and vice versa.
 - (3) It sent a daily intelligence situation report to AFHQ if necessary.
 - (4) Intelligence summaries and interrogation intelligence were to be sent directly to AFHQ with copies to 18th Army Group.
 - (5) Signal intelligence of both 1st and 8th Armies was to be controlled and co-ordinated by 18th Army Group
- g. It prepared British training and performed the normal staff functions for training British troops in the Tunisian area.
- h. Administrative functions:
 - (1) To co-ordinate and supervise the operational instructions on administrative policy.
 - (2) Routine administrative matters were to be dealt with directly between AFHQ and 1st Army or II Corps; and between GHQ Middle East Forces and 8th Army.
- i. Supply functions:
 - (1) supplies for 1st Army were to be administered by AFHQ; those of 8th Army by GHQ MEF.
 - (2) 18th Army Group was to keep itself informed on the logistical situation to and in the Tunisian area.
 - (3) It controlled the level of supply made available to each army.
 - (4) It established operational priorities for supplies to its subordinate units.
 - (5) Maintenance of air forces was to be the responsibility of AFHQ and GHQ MEF (for strategic) and armies (for immediate air support units).

Appendix J (cont.)

(6) The Ground Air Support Commander of 18th Army Group was to advise the commander of 18th Army Group on air maintenance problems.

(7) Eighteenth Army Group Headquarters was not to issue executive orders for movement (transportation in the American sense).





CHART OF COMMAND RELATIONS: AFHQ--NATOUA--SOS NATOUA
November 1943



LEGEND:
— Command
- - - Co-ordination




TABLE OF AFHQ AND NATOUSA AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL^ø

November 1942 and November 1943

OFFICERS					ENLISTED MEN				
Rank	Am		Br		Rank	Am		Br	
	Nov 42 [*]	Nov 43 ^x	Oct 42 [#]	Dec 43 [@]		Nov 42 [*]	Nov 43 ^x	Oct 42 [#]	Dec 43 [@]
Gen &					M/Sgt	29	66		
Col	52	114	37	63	T/Sgt	31	119		
Lt Col	41	124	48	101	S/Sgt	25	120	23	44
Maj	48	151	98	167	Tec 13	43	127		
Capt	53	163	85	174	Sgt	17	83	89	130
1st Lt	21	129	22	50	Tec 14	62	262		
2d Lt	2	9			Cpl	2	55	88	176
					Tec 15	50	225		
Totals:	217	690	290	555	Pfc	86	129	71	145
					Pvt		78	452	940
WARRANT OFFICERS									
CWO	4	30	23	25					
WOJG	13	25	31	48					
Totals:	17	55	54	73		345	1264	723	1435

	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>
Total Americans:	579	2012
Total British :	<u>1067</u>	<u>2060</u>
COMBINED TOTALS:	1646	4072

^ø The statistics on American authorized personnel do not include those for the Headquarters SOS NATOUSA or its subordinate base sections.


^{*} American authorized personnel as shown on AFHQ table of personnel of 19 Nov 43 in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

^x From tabulation of American authorized AFHQ and NATOUSA T/O's in effect during Nov 43 (from AG AFHQ and G-1 NATOUSA files).

[#] British authorized War Establishment for "R" Headquarters and Increment for Hq First Army (B), VIII/374/1, 12 Oct 42.


[@] AFHQ War Establishment (B), XII/1/4, effective date 1 Dec 43 (AG AFHQ file: 321-1 (AFHQ)).

ORGANIZATION CHART G-1 (B) SECTION AFHQ
30 November 1943



LEGEND:
Discontinued during 1943
Command
Co-ordination
Squares with double lines were with AFHQ in 1942

**ORGANIZATION OF G-1 SECTION NATOUSSA
September 1943**




LEGEND:

Command

----- Coordination

Subdivisions which existed in 1942

ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-2 SECTION AFHQ
August 1943



LEGEND:

Indicates units or sections controlled by G-2 AFHQ but not an organizational part of the Section.


Indicates a subdivision transferred to INC Section during 1943.

Indicates a subdivision existing before 1 December 1942.

A, B in box indicate entire subdivision is either American or British.


a, b in box indicate a mixed subdivision with an American or British officer as head.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-2 SECTION NATOUA
September 1943



LEGEND:
————— Command
----- Administrative service

ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-3 AFHQ
September 1943



LEGEND:

- Command
- - - Line of co-ordination, advice, and/or supervision.
- - - - - Related to, but not an organic part of, G-3 AFHQ.

(A), (B) Entire subdivision is either American or British as indicated.
(a), (b) A mixed subdivision headed by either an American or British officer as indicated.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-3 NATOUSA
September 1943





CHART OF ORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AFHQ
November 1943




LEGEND:


- Command
- - - Co-ordination
- Branch or section which was under CAO in 1942
- * American special staff section of Hq NATOUSA also serving AFHQ.

LIBRARY
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF G-4 (AMERICAN) AFHQ-NAIDUSA
November 1943




ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-4 (BRITISH) SECTION AFHQ
November 1943



LEGEND:
— Command
- - - Co-ordination
Existed in 1942

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART G-4 (MOVEMENTS & TRANSPORTATION) AFHQ
November 1943



AMERICAN

LEGEND:


Command


Co-ordination

Section existed in 1942.

* Both of these positions were held by the same officer.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF TRANSPORTATION SECTION NATOUA
September 1943





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The Papers of Gale, Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey Myddleton (1890-1971)

The Papers of Mockler-Ferryman, Brigadier Eric (1896-1978)

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RG 492

RG 498

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